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ABSTRACT
This thesis extends the literature on the dynamics of firm growth and failure by testing 
the robustness of past findings for capitalist firms to alternative ownership structures. 
While the theoretical results are altered by the internal organisation of the firm, the 
empirical findings are unchanged. This suggests that the theoretical models place 
excessive emphasis on the organisational structure and inadequate emphasis on more basic 
and fundamental factors affecting firm growth.
The thesis applies the learning models of growth to the case of the Illyrian labour 
managed firm, where members maximise profits per worker. The critical efficiency-size 
relationship is indeterminate under labour management. Thus, the majority of the clear 
cut empirical predictions of the model for profit maximisation no longer hold. Three 
possible explanations for the breakdown of the results are examined.
One explanation is that the Illyrian model is overly simplistic and does not accurately 
reflect the actual behaviour of cooperatives. This is rejected using an institutional 
structure model of the French producer cooperative which yields predictions which are 
remarkably similar to those of the Illyrian model.
The second explanation considered is that the growth and survival of cooperatives in fact 
substantially differs from capitalist firms. This explanation is rejected in the empirical 
section which tests the actual growth and survival relationships using a dataset of French 
producer cooperatives. The estimated survival-size relation is convexly positive and the
growth-size relation convexly negative, exactly as they have been found previously for 
conventional firms.
The final remaining explanation is that the theoretical models are structured so as to 
overemphasize the internal structure of the firm to the neglect of more generic factors 
affecting growth and survival. This is accepted in a final section which proposes new 
directions for theoretical research on the growth and survival of all firms.
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CHAPTER I: Introduction and Motivation
I would like to thank John Sutton for providing much of the 
motivation for this chapter, and Saul Estrin and Paul Geroski for 
helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own.
1. Overview
The literature on growth and survival has been characterised by a movement back and 
forth between theoretical work explaining empirical regularities, and new empirical 
regularities driving further theoretical work. The early theoretical literature on stochastic 
models of firm growth (Gibrat, 1931, Hart and Prais, 1956, Simon and Bonini, 1958) 
began by explaining an empirical regularity in existing firm datasets which suggested that 
firm growth was independent of firm size. These writers proposed explanations for this 
regularity by estimating the size distribution of firms and evaluating how this distribution 
should shift over time. The datasets used by these writers were typically based on large 
firms only.
As time passed and new technology allowed datasets to became larger and more 
comprehensive, it became possible to include increasing numbers of small firms, and it 
became clear that the conclusions of the early literature did not hold for this new class 
of firms. In fact it became apparent that growth and size were negatively related for 
small to medium sized firms. This prompted the development of new theoretical models, 
culminating most recently with the evolutionary learning models of Jovanovic (1982) and 
Ericson and Pakes (1989). These models use heterogeneous firm efficiencies to establish 
growth-size relationships for small to medium sized firms, and use the learning process 
to bring the firm’s age into the analysis as a new dimension to be studied.
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The predictions of these latter models have been put to test on data for conventional 
profit maximising firms (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989, Evans, 1987a and 1987b, 
Hall, 1987), and the results have lent added support to the theoretical modelling. 
However, the robustness of the latter class of theoretical models to changes in the internal 
structure of the firm has never been tested.
This thesis extends the literature on the dynamic behaviour of firm growth to explore the 
impact of the firm’s internal organisational and ownership structure on the process of 
growth and survival, in both theoretical and practical terms. It is shown here that using 
the recent class of evolutionary models, the past strong theoretical predictions are indeed 
altered when instead of profit maximisation, a different type of firm objective function 
is assumed. In particular, we explore here the case of the firm which is owned and 
managed by its workforce, and which maximises income per worker. It is well know in 
the labour management literature (Ward, 1958, Vanek, 1970, Ireland and Law, 1982) that 
such firms respond perversely in the short run to an improvement in output price by 
contracting rather than expanding output. In the context of the theoretical growth 
models, changes in efficiency are analogous to changes in output price. It is shown in 
Chapters II and m  that changing the type of ownership structure to labour management 
renders the predictions of the new theoretical growth models indeterminate.
In Chapter IV we test growth and survival dynamics for producer cooperatives in France. 
The choice of France was based on the fact that this country has one of the largest and 
longest standing cooperative sectors in the Western world, and data collection on this 
sector is much better than anywhere else. The findings indicate that French producer
cooperatives grow and survive in much the same way as has been documented for 
conventional profit maximising firms elsewhere.
Thus we find that the theoretical results are delicately dependent on the assumption of 
profit maximisation, while the empirical regularities that are known to hold for 
conventional firms also hold across a broader class of organisational forms. This leads 
us to conclude that some rather broad and generic empirical regularities are being 
accounted for by rather specific theoretical models. In fact the empirical findings here 
are consistent with any of a broader class of models which model growth as the outcome 
of a stochastic process which is age-dependent.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the early 
literature on the dynamics of firm growth and failure, beginning with the early work in 
the 1950’s which was based on Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect. Section 3 proceeds 
to examine the more recent literature which has moved away from Gibrat’s Law towards 
emphasizing an evolutionary learning process which leads to a natural selection of the 
most efficient firms. A brief overview of the empirical literature testing the latter class 
of models follows in Section 4.
The overview of the main content of the thesis begins in Section 5, which details the 
findings of Chapter n  of the thesis. In this chapter, the robustness of the theoretical 
results of the learning models of firm growth and failure to alternative internal 
organisational structures is put to test using an ownership structure known to behave 
differently in certain cases from the conventional profit maximising firm. This ownership
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structure is the "Illyrian firm" model of the labour managed firm, where an all member 
firm maximises member income, or "dividends", defined as profits per worker. Chapter 
II shows that when dividend maximisation is assumed, the sharp theoretical results for 
pure profit maximisation become indeterminate and in certain conditions are even 
reversed. The Illyrian firm model has been criticised in the labour management literature 
for being overly simplistic. In order to show that the breakdown of the theoretical results 
is not due to the simplicity of the Illyrian firm model, Section 6 describes the model of 
Chapter m  which incorporates the institutional details of the French cooperative sector. 
Even with this added detail, the results remain indeterminate.
Given the impact of the internal organisation of the firm on the theoretical results, the 
next step is to determine whether the empirical findings are also altered when the internal 
structure of labour management is analyzed. Section 7 describes how this is done in 
Chapter IV with a dataset of French producer cooperatives. The empirical relationships 
are found to be identical to previous results for profit maximising firms. Section 8 
discusses the implications of the fact that the theory breaks down when the internal 
structure of the firm is changed, while the empirical relationships are unaffected, as laid 
out in the conclusion to the thesis in Chapter V. This suggests that the theoretical models 
are overly specific and overemphasize the internal organisational structure of the firm, 
while neglecting the wide variety of learning activity and efficiency gains occurring over 
time within the firm. This leads us to conclude that the route for future theoretical 
research requires combining the simpler models of the past with the age dimension of the 
recent models to find a class of models that are able to explain the empirical regularities 
and at the same time remain robust to alternative forms of ownership.
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2. The Early Growth Literature
The early growth literature includes a range of studies which attempt to explain the skew 
distribution of firm sizes in a given economy. For the most part, the research from the 
1950’s onwards emphasized the need to move away from a static examination of size 
determinants and to explore the impact of the dynamic growth of firms on the steady state 
size distribution.
The early literature was built on the foundation of the Law of Proportionate Growth,
attributed first to Gibrat (1931) in his book Les Inegalit6s Economiques. and developed
further by Hart and Prais (1956) and Simon and Bonini (1958). In his book, Gibrat
argues that the log-normal distribution closely approximates the actual size distribution
of firms, and the Law of Proportionate Effect is a direct outcome of using the log-normal
distribution. The main idea is that:
"...while a larger firm may have a better chance of increasing its size by 
a given amount, the chance of a given proportionate increase is the same 
for firms of all sizes. This is the law of proportionate growth treated by 
Gibrat and is, perhaps, the most important consequence of the log-normal 
hypothesis."1
The datasets used for these studies principally include large firms. Hart and Prais (1956) 
use a U.K. dataset of firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange to analyze the 
evolution of the size distribution of firms and the impact of births and deaths of firms on 
the size distribution. Simon and Bonini (1958) use data on large American firms in 1955 
as published in Fortune magazine, as well as reusing the Hart and Prais (1956) data.
1P. E. Hart and S. J. Prais (1956), p. 161.
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Hart and Prais use the log-normal hypothesis to examine the properties of the Lorenz
curve and to explore the implications for the size distribution of firms. They find the
growth of surviving incumbents can be shown to depend on a probability scheme with
parameters which are the same as those which determine changes in business
concentration. Using aggregate data, they find that the probability of firm failure
decreases with size, and that new bom firms are smaller in average size and variance
than surviving incumbents. In support of the law of proportionate effect, they find:
"... evidence for saying that the number of companies which quadruple 
their size is approximately equal to the number that quarter it, that the 
number that grow sixteenfold is approximately equal to the number that 
are only a sixteenth of their original size, and so on; further, the 
frequency of these proportionate growths is distributed approximately as 
the normal curve of error. "2
Simon and Bonini (1958) use U.S. aggregate data to analyze the size distribution of firms 
examining additional distributions to the log-normal. They take Gibrat’s Law of 
Proportionate Effect as an assumption, and justify its use on the basis of two points: first, 
because it is consistent with empirical results, and second, assuming constant returns to 
scale beyond a minimum efficient size, they see the law as a natural conclusion. They 
hypothesise that actual firm growth for firms above the minimum efficient size will 
depend on profits, dividends, new investment, and merger activity. These factors in turn 
depend on the firm’s efficiency, overall demand conditions, product characteristics, etc.
Quandt (1966) criticises the studies of Hart and Prais (1956) and Simon and Bonini 
(1958) for their use of aggregate data, noting that cost functions and entry and exit
2Ibid, p. 171.
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conditions are likely to vary across industries, and that for certain industry definitions 
asset size distributions will not be Pareto distributed causing the composite industry not 
to be Pareto distributed either. He proposes instead that firm size transition matrices 
should depend on four factors: (1) the nature of the short run cost function, since the 
slope of this around the profit maximising point will affect the extent to which output can 
change in that neighbourhood and how costly it will be to diverge from that point; (2) the 
nature of the long run cost function, which would determine the ease of expanding 
capacity; (3) possible oligopolistic arrangements; and (4) product configurations, and 
changes in technology and demand conditions.
Quandt uses a Pareto distribution of the form:
F(x) = 1 -  ( - ) “
X
where F(x) represents the probability of observing a size less than or equal to x, and k
and a are parameters. He finds that the fit using industry data is not very good. He
concludes that this contradicts the view that firm sizes are Pareto distributed and that the
distributions are insensitive to sampling methods. He does not, however, reject the law
of proportionate effect:
”... In all likelihood the law of proportionate effect operates together with 
such complicated conditions of birth and death as to be incapable of 
yielding a pure test of the law itself."3
In summary, the basic conclusion of the early literature is that the pattern of firm growth 
follows a stochastic process that is proportionally independent of current period size, at
3Quandt (1966), p.431.
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least above the minimum efficient scale. The early literature uses data on large firms 
only and does not consider the role of the firm’s age in determining growth and survival. 
In later years, the law of proportionate effect came under attack, especially for its neglect 
of two key empirical points: (1) there does appear to be a relation between growth and 
size at least for small to medium sized firms; and (2) growth rates of firms appear to 
have a life cycle effect, with the pattern of growth and failure being age-related. The 
new literature addresses these issues.
3. The New Theoretical Growth Literature
The new growth literature examines growth and survival as outcomes of a joint decision 
process. There are two main models which both stress "learning" by firms, and bring 
in the concept of age through the learning process. The theoretical literature has two 
main examples: the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) and the active exploration 
model of Ericson and Pakes (1989). Both models have heterogeneous firms of differing 
efficiencies competing in a given market. Over time each firm acquires noisy 
information on its current and future efficiency relative to its competition, and this 
information helps it determine its overall viability and profitability. The models differ 
in that the passive learning firm passively learns the value of its time-invariant efficiency 
level while the active exploration firm actively invests to improve its efficiency relative 
to its competition.
More critically for the discussion here, both models share in common the feature that 
efficiency is positively linked to size for profit maximising firms, in that more efficient 
firms select larger operating scales to better exploit their efficiency advantage. This
positive efficiency-size relationship is the key driving force in determining the theoretical 
predictions of the models relating growth and survival to size and age. Because of this 
common positive efficiency-size relationship which drives all the other results, the growth 
and survival predictions of the two models are empirically indistinguishable.4
The new growth models predict that surviving firms are those who have been improving 
their efficiencies (in expectations or in actual levels, depending on which model is 
considered), since inefficient firms are weeded out in the selection process. But the 
positive efficiency-size relationship stipulates that size should increase when efficiency 
increases - i.e., growth of surviving firms should be positive. However, since the models 
impose an upper bound on efficiency, and through efficiency on size, the largest firms 
are increasingly constrained by the upper bound and so their growth rates ultimately 
converge to zero.
Thus, the prediction is that above a certain size, growth and size should be positively 
related for surviving firms, since these firms are on average revising their efficiency 
exposures (and therefore their sizes) upwards. In the limit as efficiencies approach the 
upper bound, growth is predicted to approach zero independently of size. In terms of the 
past literature, Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect is only expected to hold in the limit, 
that is for the very large sizes, since for this category growth is near zero regardless of 
the actual level of size.
4That is not to say that the models themselves are empirically indistinguishable, and 
Pakes and Ericson (1990) develop a nonparametric test to distinguish between the two 
types of learning. But regardless of the type of learning involved, the outcome is driven 
by the efficiency-size relationship which is identical for both models.
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The relationship between growth and age for surviving firms is also predicted to be 
increasing beyond an initial period, as the survivors on average are those who have 
received "good” information on their efficiencies. In the limit as age becomes large, the 
variability of the firm’s efficiency (expected or level, once again depending on the model) 
diminishes, and growth rates are predicted to approach zero independently of age.
In addition, these models predict that the relation between survival and size will be 
positive, since more efficient firms are larger and at the same time less likely to fail. 
The models also predict the relation between survival and age will be positive as the 
learning process leads to a weeding out of inefficient firms, so as a cohort ages the 
remaining firms are increasingly efficient and decreasingly likely to fail.
4. Empirical Robustness of New Growth Models
When taken to data these predictions are quite robust. A number of papers have explored 
the empirical relationship of growth and survival vis & vis size and age, using data on 
small and young firms as well as large and well established ones. Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson (1989), Evans (1987a and 1987b) and Hall (1987) all provide strong empirical 
support for the new theoretical models. They establish convexly increasing survival-age 
and survival-size relationships, and convexly decreasing growth-size and growth-age 
relationships. But all these papers only use data for conventional profit maximising 
firms. Like the theoretical literature, they implicitly assume that the ownership structure 
and internal organisation of the firm is not at issue, and rather the profit maximising firm 
is the standard case on which to base analysis.
5. Theoretical Robustness to Ownership Form
The positive efficiency-size prediction of the theoretical learning models is the driving 
force behind a number of the predictions on growth and survival: (1) Since less efficient 
firms tend to be selected out of the market, then the mean size of the survivors of a 
cohort should be increasing in age; (2) If less efficient firms are smaller and at the same 
time they are more likely to fail, then survival probabilities should be increasing in size; 
(3) If the least efficient firms are most likely to fail, those that survive must be receiving 
favourable (positive) news on their efficiencies and are therefore likely to grow positively 
as they age; (4) The models impose an upper bound to efficiency which implicitly places 
an upper bound on size for larger firms; therefore for large sizes, growth must be 
decreasing in size reaching zero near the upper limit.
Given the significance of the positive efficiency-size result from the comparative statics 
of the models, it becomes a rather important question to what extent this result depends 
on the assumption of profit maximisation. More precisely, to what extent do the results 
for profit maximisation hold generally for other forms of ownership and organisational 
structure?
The second chapter of the thesis addresses these questions by taking a form of internal 
organisation that is known to select its optimal scale differently from the conventional 
profit maximising firm - that is the case of the firm that is owned and managed by its 
workforce. In particular, we examine the case of the Wardian Illyrian firm5, where an 
all member worker cooperative maximises member incomes, given by the rate of profits
5Ward (1958).
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per worker (dividends). This is the simplest and the most extensively studied model of 
the labour managed firm. It is well known in the labour management literature that such 
firms respond to an improvement in output price in the short run by contracting output, 
and in the long run, with capital and labour both allowed to vary, the sign of the response 
is indeterminate.6
In terms of the modelling here, an increase in efficiency is analogous to an increase in 
price. Thus, when the dividend-maximisation objective function is used in conjunction 
with the learning models of firm growth, and capital and labour are both allowed to vary, 
the critical comparative statics result on the efficiency-size relationship becomes 
indeterminate, where it was strictly positive under profit maximisation. As a result, only 
a few of the empirical predictions hold definitively and the model has very little to say 
about the growth and survival relationships described above. The only empirical 
predictions that are unaffected by the change in the objective function are those that are 
independent of the efficiency-size relationship and are direct outcomes of the nature of 
the learning process.
A special example is also presented in Chapter II in which the efficiency-size relationship 
is shown to be negative. This example serves to illustrate that a negative efficiency-size 
relationship is in fact possible, and would lead to a reversal of most of the predictions 
of the evolutionary learning models. Because it is such a special case, however, the 
significance of the example in predicting the actual behaviour of these firms should not 
be overemphasized.
6See for example Ireland and Law, 1982, Stephen, 1984, Estrin, 1982.
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Although the Illyrian firm model of Chapter II is used extensively for theoretical 
purposes, it has often been criticised in the literature on labour managed firms for being 
unrealistically simple relative to the actual rules and constraints that govern the behaviour 
of these firms. A considerable body of research has been devoted to modifying the 
simple Illyrian firm model to offset the perversity of the short run supply response.7 
Some of these models have added institutional features such as the inclusion of 
nonmember labour (Miyazaki, 1984, Ben Ner, 1984) to test whether the short run 
perversity and long run indeterminacy remain.
To preclude any possibility that the evolutionary models fail to produce sharp predictions 
because of the over-simplicity of the Illyrian firm model, Chapter III replicates the 
analysis of Chapter II using a model of the French producer cooperative which closely 
reflects the actual institutional rules and features governing cooperatives in France.
6. The Membership Model of the French Producer Cooperative
The French producer cooperative model in Chapter III incorporates a number of key 
institutional rules and features. First, it includes the membership remuneration process, 
whereby all workers receive both a fixed wage and a variable profitsharing, and members 
receive an additional return on their membership shares. To this is added the most 
significant institutional rule governing the behaviour of these firms, the condition of Free 
Access. Free Access enables nonmember workers to convert to membership status at will 
by purchasing at face value a single share in the firm; it also enables members to become
7See for example Bonin (1984), Brewer and Browning (1982), Spinnewyn and 
Svejnar (1989), Svejnar (1982).
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nonmember workers in the firm by redeeming their shares at face value. It is shown that 
the effect of Free Access is to drive the return on membership shares to always equal the 
market rate of interest, as long as some nonmembers remain in the firm. Third, the 
method of financing the maintenance and purchase of the firm’s capital is also 
incorporated: In this model, as long as there exist some nonmembers the firm is shown 
to always resort to internal equity financing through membership shares. Only when the 
entire workforce is comprised of members will the firm resort to external financing. 
Finally, the laws governing the shutdown of cooperatives are also incorporated. These 
laws stipulate that in the event of shutdown, any residual profits over and above the face 
value of outstanding shares may not revert to the members of the firm.
In terms of the issue of interest, the efficiency-size relationship, the French producer 
cooperative model provides a guarded defense of the use of the more manageable Illyrian 
firm model in theoretical work. It is shown that under external financing, the French 
model with all its detail simplifies into the general form of the Chapter II Illyrian firm 
model. If internal financing is used, the model remains remarkably similar to the Illyrian 
firm model, with the same choice of returns to scale and the same worker earnings 
resulting from both models. In either case of financing the efficiency-size relationship 
remains indeterminate for the French cooperative, similar to the Illyrian firm model in 
Chapter II.8
8However, as a separate issue of principal relevance to the literature on labour 
management, the French cooperative model provides explanations for two empirical facts: 
first, it gives a theoretical explanation for the lower observed cooperative hazard rates 
relative to conventional firms; and second, it explains the lack of virtually any observed 
degeneration of cooperatives into capitalist firms in France.
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Thus it is clear that the breakdown of the sharp predictions of the theoretical learning 
models can not be attributed to the excessive simplicity of the model of the labour 
managed firm. Furthermore, at least one example exists where the results of the learning 
models of growth and survival are not left unchanged by the assumption of alternative 
ownership structures. It remains to be seen if in fact the empirical behaviour of such 
firms differs in any marked way from past findings for profit maximising firms.
7. Empirical Findings on French Cooperative Growth and Survival
Chapter IV tests the theoretical predictions of the first two chapters using a dataset of the 
entire population of French producer cooperatives between 1979 and 1989. While it is 
not possible to measure the efficiency-size relationship in practice since no proper 
measure of efficiency is available, the growth-size and survival-size relationships can be 
used to infer the efficiency-size relationship. The empirical results show the growth-size 
relationship to be convexly negative, while survival-size is positive and slightly convex. 
Growth-age is found to be convexly negative, approaching zero for older ages, while 
survival-age is convexly positive with older firms more likely to survive. These results 
are consistent with a positive underlying efficiency-size relationship similar to past 
findings for conventional firms.
The fact that the empirical results under labour management are exactly identical to those 
found for profit maximising firms (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989, Evans, 1987a, 
1987b, and Hall 1987) is in stark contrast to the impact of the labour management 
assumption on the theoretical results. Thus the conclusion is that the empirical
relationships are broad and generic empirical regularities independent of the
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organizational form of the firm, unlike the theoretical results which depend delicately on 
the objective function considered.
Chapter IV also examines the shifts in predicted survival rates over the business cycle to 
find that young firms and firms that are very small or very large are jeopardised to a 
greater extent by business cycle slowdowns than old and medium-sized firms. 
Additionally, predicted growth rates for the smallest and youngest surviving firms, which 
are normally the fastest growing firms in the economy, are found to decline 
proportionally more in times of high unemployment than larger and older firms, with 
growth rates across all size and age classes converging together as unemployment rises. 
The conclusion is that small and young firms, and to a lesser extent very large firms, are 
the class of firms most vulnerable to exogenous shocks.
8. Implications for Future Research
Thus the main finding of the thesis has been that the theoretical learning models rely to 
a great extent on the ownership structure of the firm to generate the positive efficiency- 
size relationship that is the driving force behind the results. Yet the empirical regularities 
they explain appear to be entirely independent of the internal organisation of the firm, 
and could just as well be explained by any of a much broader class models which share 
in common certain specific features. The nature of such a class of models is discussed 
further in Chapter V, where it is shown that the nature of the learning process is all- 
important in determining the sign and causality of the efficiency-size relationship. By 
broadening the definition of efficiency gains from learning beyond pure cost reduction, 
any of a class of learning models can be used to generate growth and survival predictions
that are robust to alternative forms of ownership.
Thus it appears that future research on the theories of stochastic firm growth would 
benefit from taking a step back to reexamine the current state of research on this subject. 
It is clear, however, that the age dimension introduced in the new growth literature has 
a significant role to play in modelling both growth and survival. An all-encompassing 
new class of models could model growth as a stochastic process which is not only state 
dependent, as in the early literature, but also age-dependent, as in the new literature, with 
the learning process more broadly defined than before. This sets one possible route for 
future research in this area.
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CHAPTER II: A Comparison of Labour-Managed and Capitalist 
firm Growth and Survival Dynamics*
*1 would like to thank Saul Estrin, John Sutton, Norman 
Ireland, Klaus Schmidt and Paul Geroski for helpful 
comments and discussions. Any remaining errors are, of 
course, my own.
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1. Introduction
In the past, a number of studies have examined the relationship between firm survival, 
growth, size, and age from both theoretical and empirical standpoints. In particular, 
Jovanovic (1982) introduced a model of passive learning which has since been used as 
the foundation for much of the subsequent analysis of these issues (Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson, 1989, Evans 1987a, 1987b, Hall 1987, etc.) Subsequently, Ericson and 
Pakes (1989) presented an alternative model, the active exploration model of firm growth 
and failure, which they tested against the passive learning model in Pakes and Ericson 
(1990). Yet all the work to date has focused on the case of the profit maximizing 
capitalist firm. This paper tests the robustness of the results of the passive learning and 
active exploration models to alternative ownership and internal organisational structures 
using the case of the labour managed firm, a type of firm known to select its scale of 
operations differently from the conventional profit maximising firm. In doing so, we are 
able to determine the extent to which previous findings depend specifically on the 
organisational structure of the firm.
Sections 2 and 3 present modified versions of the passive learning and active exploration 
models for the PMF, and most of the predictions of the models on growth and survival 
are shown to depend on the positive efficiency-size result in the comparative statics 
analysis. Both learning models are shown to yield the same efficiency-size relationships, 
but with one key difference: the dependence of the passive learning firm’s size on its
initial size does not erode over time while for the active learning firm it does. Section 
4 extends the analysis on firm growth and failure to the case of the Illyrian labour 
managed firm. The effect of an improvement in efficiency on the size (and therefore 
growth) of the labour managed firm under both learning models is found to be 
indeterminate. Section 5 explores a special example of a labour managed firm where the 
efficiency-size relationship is negative. Section 6  presents the main theoretical findings, 
while the empirical predictions of the model are presented in Section 7. Section 8  
summarizes and concludes.
2. The Modified Passive Learning Model
For the purpose of this analysis, we assume firms are operating under perfect competition 
and are thus price takers in both input and output markets. Furthermore, the smaller 
cooperative sector exists side by side a larger capitalist sector in the same economy, and 
workers are assumed to be able to move freely between firms in the two sectors.
The analysis will study the behaviour of two types of firm: First, the traditional Wardian 
Illyrian type of dividend-maximising labour managed firm is considered, where all 
workers are members. The opportunity cost for these workers of remaining in the 
cooperative sector is the capitalist wage, which is exogenously determined. All firms in 
both sectors are assumed to be too small relative to the industry to affect prices in any 
period. All price vectors, i.e., {pt}, {rt} and {wt} are known in advance and are assumed 
to change at the same rate {7 J  from one period to the next.
The capitalist "twin" is a firm in the same industry with access to the same technology,
facing the same input and output prices and the same shocks, with only one difference: 
unlike the LMF, it maximises profits, rather than profits per worker (i.e., dividends).
The passive learning model operates under the assumption that firms in a given industry 
have the same cost functions which are U-shaped for all input prices, and production 
functions which are locally concave. 1 The key difference between firms is in their 
relative efficiencies in producing sellable output. Specifically, in each period, the firm’s 
actual output is given by the basic production function multiplied by a random variable 
which is a noisy indicator of the firm’s true relative efficiency. The efficiency factor 
could be thought to represent a wastage rate, as some of the output produced falls below 
minimum specifications. Alternatively, it could represent the advantageousness of the 
firm’s choice of technology, location, management, etc. Because the firm is unaware of 
its true efficiency, it forms an expectation of this random variable. It updates this 
expectation every period using Bayes’ Law, after observing its profits for that period.
Firms produce a single homogeneous product. The level of output is given by the 
production function in which the efficiency rate normalised to one. Firms entering this 
industry are endowed at birth with certain immutable efficiency characteristics (quality 
of management, location, labour force skills, etc.) which determine their true rates of 
efficiency relative to the production function’s normalised rate of one.
The relative efficiency of the firm is characterised by a parameter 6 representing
^ee  Ireland and Law (1982) pp. 27-28 for a discussion of why the production 
function for a labour managed firm may not be globally concave, except for a firm which 
only employs a single worker.
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performances above or below the normalised rate given by the standard production 
function. The firm does not know its true efficiency endowment, but knows the 
distribution from which it is drawn. It is therefore forced to deduce its efficiency from 
its observed sales, which provide a noisy estimate (t/,) in each period of the true 
endowment (0 ), where the noise (ej consists of zero mean i.i.d. shocks:
il, = 0  + e, 
e  -  Af(9 , a e2)
€ , ~  N (0 ,a 2)
Since the firm is unable to observe its true efficiency endowment 0, it bases its decision­
making on the sequence { i f c - i - »^ li} - The et shocks are assumed to be firm-specific, 
and are independent over time and across firms.
The true (noiseless) relative efficiency multiple of the firm is a transformation of 0, 
labelled x, and is given by the function x =  £(0 ), where £(0 ) >  0 , £ '(0) > 0  and continuous, 
lim £(0)= cq > 0 and lim £(0)=a2< 00 • That is, the multiple is always positive, (to pre-
0-> -oo $-* oo
elude negative output), and is increasing in 0 ; i.e., the more efficient the firm is, the 
more sellable output it can get out of the same inputs. The upper bound a2 is needed 
because the most efficient firm can at best produce 100% sellable output. Since the firms 
are unable to actually observe 0 , and in fact only observe rj, they are forced to develop 
expectations on the value of x based on the observed sequence of {17}.
The firm’s expected relative efficiency factor is a random variable denoted x*t and given 
by:
-31-
x \= E ,[ x  | T|r_i»T|t_2>...,r|j]
The firm updates its expectations on its relative efficiency multiple by means of Bayes’ 
Law: in each period t, the firm estimates the probability of its having a certain efficiency 
factor x given that it has observed to date the sequence of { ^ . l5 rju2, Vi) noisy 
estimates of 0. It revises its estimate of its x* to correspond to its new expected value.
The evolution of x* is governed by the following probability function:
P(x'  I* \ , n j  = Pr(x =x'  \x ’ =x \ ,n = n j
The x*t sequence is a Martingale so all currently available information is incorporated in 
x*t. It follows that the current expectation of x* for all future periods is the current value 
of x*t:
Et[x'tJ = x \  V k>0
In this context we can now set up the firm’s objective function. Considering the two 
input case, actual output is given by the efficiency-adjusted production function:
x*qt = x*q(KfiLt)
where qK>0, qL>0, qKK<0> qix<0> and qLK=qKL> 0- So in each period, the profit 
maximising firm (PMF) maximises profits subject to the condition that the expected 
discounted value of future cash flows exceeds the opportunity cost, $ . We define the 
binary variable, Xt> equal to one if the firm operates in period t and zero otherwise. 
Thus, in any period r, the PMF maximises the expected discounted value of future cash
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flows:
<de A}
d  = { \XtJ W ,  • • • } (2.1)
where:
7r*t= expected single period profits 
IQ= capital 
Lt= labour
nt=  number of periods since firm was created 
j8 = discount rate
$ =  opportunity cost of remaining in business 
The firm will exit only if the expected discounted value of future cash flows from 
remaining in business is less than $. Otherwise, the firm selects its input levels to 
maximize current period profits:
pT= output price 
rT= cost of capital 
wT= market wage
The first order conditions for profit maximization become (omitting time subscripts):
where:
(2.2)
PX qK = r
and
px*qL = w
(2.3)
Differentiating (2.2) and (2.3) with respect to x* yields:
8K „ d L , 1
—  = I—  -  9 a
(2.4)
and
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(2.5)
dL _ t -4l _ dK , 1 
ax ' x '  9“ ac* qu.
Solving simultaneously yields:
(2.6)
dK Qll . [ S e  + SlSlL]
^  QkkQ l l 'Q k l  x  x  4 l l  
and
(2.7)
dL Qkk . [ S e  + SjtljE]
QllQkk 'Q lk x  x  4kk
Since by the second order condition for maximisation the determinant of the Hessian 
matrix, (QllQkk-Qlk2)> is positive, both expressions are strictly positive.
Thus a capitalist firm raising its expectation of its relative efficiency (x*) will increase the 
use of both inputs. The change in the level of output will be given by the total 
differential of the efficiency-adjusted production function:
d . . . dL dK (2' 8)
- ( x  q) = q * qL—  + qK—
dx* dx* dx'
With q non-negative, qL and qx positive, and (<3L/dx*) and (dYJdx) both positive, it 
follows that an upward revision of x* will result in an increase in the level of current 
output chosen by the PMF. Thus we arrive at Jovanovic’s key result: the relationship 
between efficiency and size is positive.
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3. The Modified Active Exploration Model
Ericson and Pakes (1989) present a model in which the firm is formed to exploit some 
Schumpeterian "idea". However, the firm can not determine the true value of its idea 
unless it invests capital in the development and exploitation of the idea. In this world, 
an efficient firm is one with a "good idea" who successfully exploits it. Unlike the 
passive learning model, in any given period the firm knows exactly what its current "state 
of efficiency" is. Moreover this state of efficiency, which reflects the firm’s overall 
viability, is no longer static but evolves over time in response to the outcomes of the 
firm’s exploratory investment.
Uncertainty enters the model through the assumption that the firm does not know what 
the outcome of its investment in development will be, it only knows the underlying 
probability distribution of moving from its current state to other states. The outcome of 
(exploratory) investment depends on the firm’s own past investment, investment by other 
firms in the industry and overall demand conditions. 2 The firm’s state may indeed 
deteriorate if exploration is unsuccessful or insufficient. The firm is unable to observe 
current or past investment by its rivals, but can observe the outcomes of rivals’ past 
investments which contribute to determining the firm’s own current state. If the firm’s 
state deteriorates over time, it may signal that the idea is not worth pursuing and in such 
case, the firm will shut down.
To formalise the model, we let a SEE represent an index of the firm’s state of efficiency, 
and itE R+ represent the firm’s exploratory investment activity in period t. The function
2The firm’s present investment can only affect its future states.
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A(* | Ot) provides current period profits, determined by the market equilibrium. In the 
two input case, this function is given by:
A t = Pt x t ( ° )  ~ r t K t ~ w t L t
(3.1)
where x =  ft a,) once again represents the relative efficiency multiple of the firm. The
value of this multiple reflects the advantages the firm can exact due to its state relative
to other firms in the industry. For ease of comparison with the passive learning case,
we assume f ta JX ) and ^(ot) >0 , with lim f(°t)= a i and lim ^ a t) = a 2. The cost of
crt->— oo at-» +  oo
capital is given by rt, the market rate of interest. 3 In any period, if the firm operates and
invests in development, the current returns are given by:
R, s R(x(o)j) = 4(-|ot) -  rjt
The opportunity cost of remaining in business is given by $. We define the binary 
variable xt equal to one if the firm operates in period t and zero otherwise. We assume 
current investment only affects future states, and the evolution of future states is governed 
by the state-dependent transition probability function:
p(a/|o,0 = ProWptti=o'\o=oj=i)
(3.3)
the realisations of which fully determine A(-1 ai), and p(-1 aJ. In each period, the firm 
evaluates the expected discounted value of future cash flows from remaining in business. 
If this value is not below the opportunity cost, $ , the firm continues to operate. It then 
makes the optimal level of exploratory investment based on its investment history and its
3Ericson and Pakes allow the cost of capital to vary with at. Here, we use an 
exogenous market rate for ease of comparison with the passive learning model.
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current and past states. Given the level of current investment, it chooses inputs to 
maximize the level of current period profits.
This leads to the following entrepreneurial optimisation problem:
* 2  «  *
Max K % =£ P'j"[fl(*(<J/I),i,)x,+(Xt-i "X,)4>] ‘ 
ideA) P'„ W o '.X o ) ! ^  ) W o )  (3,4)
T 5=0
where d = { [ x , * , A .,] ,  -  *
where /? is the firm’s discount factor.
Once the firm decides to operate and chooses its’ optimal level of exploratory investment, 
it chooses inputs to maximise current period profits given i,. Current profits are identical 
to the passive learning case, except exploratory investment appears as a lump sum current 
cost. But exploratory investment does not impact the current period state, aT, or xT, so 
it does not affect the marginal choice of current input levels. Thus, the first order 
conditions for production inputs are identical to those for the passive learning case (2 .2 ) 
and (2.3).
(3.5)
P W k  = r
and (3.6)pxqL = w
It follows then, that the comparative statics on the effect of a change in the efficiency 
factor, x, on production inputs and output is also exactly the same as in the passive 
learning case and will not be repeated here. What matters principally is that the critical
relationship between efficiency and size remains positive.
Because of the identical behavioral predictions regarding size, Pakes and Ericson (1990) 
develop a separate test to determine which model is more relevant for their data on profit 
maximising firms. They show that for a passive learning firm which spends its life trying 
to determine the value of a stationary efficiency parameter, the dependence of the firm’s 
size in any period on its initial size does not erode over time. This arises from the fact 
that the information acquired in the first period carries a weight in determining the firm’s 
current expectation of its efficiency equal to the weight of the most recent observation. 
This is not true for the active exploration firm, whose state of efficiency evolves over 
time causing older information to be increasingly less relevant to the firm’s current state. 
We will show that this test is unaffected by the imposition of the LMF objective function.
4. The Labour Managed Firm Models
4.1 The Passive Learning Model of the Labour Managed Firm
Beginning with Ward’s seminal paper on "The Firm in Illyria" in 1958, the labour 
management literature has adopted the assumption that labour managed firms (LMFs) 
maximise member incomes, or "dividends", defined as the rate of profits per worker. 
One outcome of this assumption is that faced with an increase in output price, in the short 
run the firm will reduce both labour and output. This perverse short run supply response 
has been the subject of much research, and the Illyrian firm objective function has been 
criticised mainly because it does not account for the fact that revisions in the level of the 
firm’s labour input may cause certain members to be forced to leave the firm, and this 
fact should affect a democratic firm’s labour input decision.
Numerous modifications and constraints on the objective function have been suggested 
by various authors and countless papers have been written on the issue.4 For this 
reason, we will not delve further into the subject and define the voting structure of the 
firm as follows: the firm elects a management committee for a fixed period of time. This 
committee then makes decisions in each period on the level of inputs required to 
maximise expected dividends for those who ultimately remain in the firm, since only these 
latter individuals will be around to vote when the committee comes up for reelection. 5
Thus, the LMF objective function is taken to be (expected) dividend maximisation, 6 
where dividends are defined as profits divided by the level of the workforce. We now 
formally define the problem of the LMF as maximising the expected discounted value of 
future cash flows per worker:
°2
Max Z, = £  p 'f [ D ( * > PV . , ) v ( X <-1-X ,)-^-+(
<-* «, Lt-1
icteA} P(x* =s\x* ^ n^ds
where cM [xt 4l, J ,  ••• > (4 .0 )
and D*t= expected single period dividend 
Kt= capital 
Lt= labour
nt= number of periods since firm was created 
(3= discount rate
4There are many examples in the literature. A small selection includes Sertel (1982), 
Spinnewyn and Svejnar (1986), Brewer and Browning (1982), Bonin (1984), and 
Miyazaki (1984).
5This procedure in fact closely approximates the actual decision structure of most 
firms above a minimum size in most countries.
6An alternative and more complex objective function is examined in Chapter III.
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If ZT < ((^/L^+EftW j), i.e., if LMF workers prefer to leave the cooperative sector to 
become hired workers for a PMF, then the firm exits. The residual value of the firm is 
divided among the number of workers from the previous period, since no decision is 
made on current employment if the firm is to close down. If the firm continues to 
operate, it chooses inputs to maximise single period dividends:
where:
pT= output price 
rT= cost of capital 
nT= age of firm
The first order conditions become:
where (4.2) is identical to the PMF choice of capital in (2.2), but by (4.3) the LMF 
chooses its workforce to set the expected marginal revenue product of labour equal to the 
endogenous dividend, rather than the exogenous PMF wage.
p , x \ q ( K ^ ) - r TKt
(4.1)
p x q K = r
(4.2)
and
(4.3)
Differentiating (4.2) and (4.3) with respect to x" yields:
Equation (4.4) is exactly identical to (2.4); the LMF revises its level of capital in exactly 
the same way the PMF does. The new level of capital input is different only because 
dL/dx* (and the resulting new level of output) differ between the two types of firm.
Equation (4.5) differs from equation (2.5), the PMF labour-revision equation, by the 
addition of the term q/(Lx*). This term reflects the fact that the endogenous LMF 
dividend, unlike the exogenous PMF wage, is affected when x* changes.
Solving (4.4) and (4.5) simultaneously yields:
<L_ 
L
X' X‘
dK _ Qll .  ~4k Qki  . (4.6)
and
Z -q L
dL _ Qkk  ^QkQlk t L  ^ ( 4  7 )
Q ll4kk~Q lk x  Qkk x
In both equations, the first expressions on the right hand side are strictly negative by the 
second order condition for maximum and the assumption of diminishing marginal returns. 
The second (bracketed) expressions are in both cases indeterminate in sign. In each case, 
the first of the two terms in brackets is negative, the second positive. Looking at the
bracketed expressions, the difference between these and the PMF twin conditions (2.6) 
and (2.7), lies in the addition of the positive terms q/(Lx*)(-qKL/qLL) to (4.6) and q/(Lx*) 
to (4.7). When multiplied by the negative first expression, these have a negative effect 
on both (3K/3x*) and (dL/dx*) causing the overall sign to be indeterminate. It is useful 
to note that this result parallels the long run supply response of the labour managed firm, 
which is also indeterminate (Ireland and Law, 1982, Estrin, 1982). This arises from the 
fact that in this model structure an improvement in efficiency has exactly the same impact 
on the firm as an increase in demand.
It is clear, however, that the revision in capital and labour for the LMF will always be 
strictly less than the corresponding revision for a twin PMF of identical efficiency 
because of the additional negative term appearing in the LMF equations (4.6) and (4.7).
2 V  LMF X i r  PMF 27  LMF 2 7  PMF
(— ) < ( — ) ; (— ) < ( — )
dx* dx* dx* dx* (4.8)
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that in its labour decision, the LMF balances the loss
in dividends from having more workers sharing in profits against the improvement in
dividends from having more workers sharing capital costs. For the PMF, payments to
labour are exogenously determined and fixed, and of course capital costs are not borne
by workers. So unlike the LMF, it need not consider the feedback effect of an increase
in employment on the marginal cost of labour. This feedback effect constrains the LMF
from expanding labour by as much as the PMF. The first order conditions for capital are
exactly the same for both types of firm: they both equate the marginal revenue product
of capital to the cost of capital, fo r a given level o f labour. But if the LMF revises
labour by less than the PMF, the revision in the marginal product of capital will also be
less, and therefore the ensuing revision in capital will have to be less.
The lower revisions in capital and labour additionally imply that the LMF’s revision in 
output (also given by equation (2.8)) will be strictly less than the PMF’s. This leads us 
to the following observation:
Observation: The surviving LMF’s revision in both inputs and output in response to an 
improvement in expected efficiency will always be strictly less than that o f  the twin 
PMF.
Whether the LMF actually will choose to increase output depends on the precarious 
balance between capital, labour and dividends. If the firm is allowed to increase its 
capital relative to labour, and there exists a technology which enables the firm to increase 
revenues per worker by more than capital costs per worker, the firm will expand. 
Otherwise, it will contract to enjoy a higher dividend rate. It is precisely this ability to 
substitute capital for labour that makes the second bracketed expressions in (4.6) and
(4.7) indeterminate in sign.
4.2 The Active Learning Model of the Labour Managed Firm
Once again assuming dividend-maximisation, the objective of the labour-managed firm 
is to maximise the expected discounted value of future cash flows per worker:
*2
Max Zt = Y ,  P '/ [ f l ( i ( a ',y ,M ) Z ,+(ZM -Z r) - p - +(1 - X ,K ]  •
«  «, L«-i
WeA) P ‘ [0 ',-o lfi, ) \d < j  (4-9)
T 3=0
where d  = { I x J . X M ,  [ Z w - ' t . i ^ i A J -  ••• 1
The firm will remain in operation if the net present value to members of remaining in 
business, Zt(xt= l) ,  exceeds the opportunity cost to the member. The opportunity cost 
to the worker is his share of the shutdown value, $ , plus the present discounted value of 
receiving the capitalist wage from this period onwards:
z ,(z ,= D  * Y ~  ♦ E  P,w,
T~1 t-Z
Once the firm decides to operate and chooses its’ sequence of optimal levels of 
exploratory investment, {it}, it chooses its inputs for the current period to maximise 
current dividends given {it}. As in the case of the profit maximising firm, the problem 
is identical to the passive learning case and the reaction of firm size to a change in the 
efficiency parameter will be computed in exactly the same way as before.
The comparative statics will again be given by (4.6) and (4.7), and the sign of the 
efficiency-size relationship will be indeterminate depending on the actual specification of 
the production function and the location of the firm along the production function. Of 
key importance to the discussion here, the efficiency-size relationship will be identical in 
the active exploration and passive learning models for the LMF, just as they were fo r the 
PMF. The Pakes and Ericson test between the two learning models is unaffected by the 
change in the organisational structure of the firm since the test is derived from the nature
of the learning process and not from the firm’s response to changes in its (expected) 
efficiency. This is discussed further in section 6 .
First, however, we note that the main cause of the sign ambiguity of equations (4.6) and
(4.7) arises from the impact of an improvement in efficiency on the choice of inputs. 
Holding inputs constant, an improvement in efficiency raises dividends leaving the cost 
of capital unchanged, creating an incentive for the firm to increase capital relative to 
labour. At the same time the marginal revenue product of capital has risen above its 
rental cost, creating an incentive to lower capital. The net effect is therefore 
indeterminate, unlike the profit maximisation case where the efficiency-size relation is 
unambiguously positive. In fact, it is not implausible for the LMF’s efficiency-size 
relationship to be negative, as is shown in a special case example in the next section.
5. Special Case: Perverse Efficiency-Size Relationship
In this special case, we explore the effect of using a short run production function of the
form: _
q(L,K) = L f
(5.1)
where 0</3< 1 .
Under this production technology, PMF profits are given by:
n(x*t K) = px*L* -  rK -  wL
(5.2)
The only choice variable in the short run is labour, and the first order condition will be 
given by:
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—  = / a ' p i " - 1 - w  = 0 
dL (5.3)
Differentiating (5.3) with respect to x*:
dL \pmf _ 1(— ) 
dx* x*(l~P )L
> 0  for  0 <p<l (5.4)
The effect on output will be positive as well:
d x ' dx ' (5 .5)
> 0  far —  > 0  
cbt‘
Now we consider the same example for the LMF. The short run LMF dividend 
becomes:
D(x’, K) =
L (5.6)
Once again the only choice variable is labour, the first order condition for which is:
—  = (P-1 )px'L*~2 + ^  = 0
dL y  l 2 (5.7)
which simplifies to:
rKx*L* = ---------  = constant
(1-P)P (5.8)
So the level of efficiency-adjusted output is always constant for an LMF operating under
this technology regime.
Differentiating with respect to x*:
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L f + x ’PL*-'—  = 0  
dx '
or = o
3x ' **p
(5.9)
From equation (5.9), the impact of an increase in efficiency is to unambiguously lower 
labour input. However, we know from (5.8) that efficiency-adjusted output is constant, 
so, the decrease in labour must be exactly offsetting the increase in efficiency.
We can make this even more clear by examining the total differential of efficiency- 
adjusted output:
ix 'L * )  = L* + x 'P L *-1-
d x ' dx ' (5 . 1 0 )
= Z,p + ^*pLp' ‘(— ) = 0 
x*P
Thus efficiency-adjusted output is left unchanged following an increase in the level of the 
firm’s efficiency. The effect on output will be negative if we add an assumption that an 
improvement in efficiency leads to a lowering of fixed costs, for example through a 
reduction in the cost of capital. If the cost of capital r, is given by r(x*), where r'(x*) < 0 
and r"(x*)>0, then equation (5.9) would be rewritten as:
dL = __L_  + Kr'jx') < Q
dx * x*P (1-P) px* p LP- 1 (5.11)
The effect on efficiency-adjusted output, x*q, would be:
— (x'L*) = L f + Jt*pI|M—  
d x ' dx '
m L f +  r'(x*)K _ L > 
)P
< 0
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(5.12)
Thus we have shown that a "perverse" case exists in which an improvement in efficiency 
actually leads the firm to contract output, at least in the short run. Whether or not this 
case is generally applicable, the broader result still holds: The learning models’ clear 
and unambiguous results fo r  the PMF become indeterminate fo r  the LMF. In the 
special "perverse" case, of course, the PMF results are actually reversed for the LMF.
Table 1
GENERAL CASE PERVERSE CASE
PMF LMF PMF LMF
dUdx* positive indeterminate but <PM F positive negative
dKIdx* positive indeterminate but <PM F zero zero
d/dx* (x*q) positive indeterminate but <PM F positive negative
The efficiency adjusted output results here are analogous to the revenue effect of an 
increase in price, rather than the related output effect which has been extensively studied 
in the perverse short run supply literature. In the next section we proceed to show the 
main comparative results of the two types of ownership.
6. Results
It is quite clear that predictions from the comparative statics results all hinge on the 
response of current period size to a change in the firm’s level of (expected) efficiency. 
These comparative statics results are identical for passive learning and active exploration.
Lemma
The net present value o f future cash flows, V tfor the PMF and Z?,for the LMF, must be 
strictly increasing in x . 7
Remark
Exit occurs at the point o f zero net present value o f expected profits (excess dividends) 
where V T=$ fo r the PMF and Z*T= (Q/L^) +11(3twt fo r the LMF). This leads us to the 
following result:
Theorem 1
Both firms will exit at the same level o f  (expected) relative efficiency (x j. At this point, 
both firms exactly cover the opportunity cost o f  remaining in business.
Proof The detailed proof is listed in the appendix to this chapter, but the intuition behind 
the result is as follows: At the zero profits point, the LMF dividend exactly equals the 
PMF wage and both firms are just breaking even. Below this point, both will choose to 
exit.
Thus we have (xo)PMF = (xo)LMF for both types of LMF, meaning that both firms exit at 
the same level of expected relative efficiency. It remains to be shown that this level of 
x0 is the only point at which both firms choose the same level of inputs and outputs.
7The proof of this lemma is identical to the Proof of Theorem 1 in Jovanovic (1982), 
and is laid out in detail in the Appendix (p. 6 6 6 ) of that paper.
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Theorem 2
The zero profit point, (x j, is the only point at which twin PMF and LMF firms will 
select the same production technology and output levels.
Proof The intuition behind the result is as follows: Since the LMF dividend exactly 
equals the PMF wage at x0, both firms select exactly the same levels of inputs to produce 
the same level of output.
The choice of labour in each period is given by the first order conditions for 
maximisation. For the PMF,
PX*qL = w
and for the LMF,
PX*qL = D*
For both firms the choice of capital is given by:
px*qK = r
In each period, the choice of labour input will be the same if and only if:
D* = w
Whenever the choice of labour is the same, the choice of capital will automatically be the 
same since the first order conditions for capital are identical, given the same choice of 
labour. But the only time the dividend will exactly equal the wage rate is when the firms 
are just breaking even, that is at the point x0 at which no economic rents are being
earned. At this point the firm is indifferent between staying in the industry and exiting. 
Since there are no positive rents to be distributed as excess dividends or capitalist profits, 
the expected dividend exactly equals the wage rate, expected profits equal zero, and both 
firms choose the same level of labour and capital (and therefore output.)
Theorem 3
Under the passive learning model o f  firm  growth, the dependence o f  firm  size in any 
period t on size in period t-k (k>0) does not erode as k  becomes large. Under the 
active exploration model, it does.
Proof
The formal proof of this theorem is given in Pakes and Ericson (1990). As discussed in 
Section 3, this test arises from the fact that for the passive learning model, the efficiency 
parameter 9 is stationary; that is, unlike o in the active exploration model, it does not 
evolve with the passage of time. The intuition behind the Pakes and Ericson result is that 
through exploratory investment, the active exploration firm is able to change its value of 
<t over time so in period t, it may in no way resemble the value in period t-k, especially 
if k is large. The passive learning firm, however, is always trying to figure out the level 
of the same fixed relative efficiency parameter, so the information from an observation 
in any particular period carries exactly the same weight in determining the firm’s 
expectation as the most recent observation the firm has received.
7. Empirical Predictions
For the PMF, a number of interesting empirical predictions emerge from the theoretical
results. However, it will be shown here that the indeterminacy of the efficiency-size 
relationship renders the majority of these predictions ambiguous for the LMF.
The empirical predictions arising from the results of the model can be grouped in four 
parts: (1) predictions for surviving versus failing firms of the same cohort; (2 ) predictions 
across ownership form for survivors from the same cohort; (3) predictions for surviving 
firms of the same size across ownership forms; and (4) predictions for all firms across 
growth models. These predictions are grouped and displayed in Tables 2 to 5.
Table 2 
Proposition 1
Within a sample o f  PMFs, failing PMF firm s from a given cohort will be smaller (in 
terms o f  both inputs and outputs) than PMF survivors o f  the same cohort, Within a 
sample o f  LMFs the survivaUsize relationship is indeterminate.
Failing firms are those which on average have been receiving bad news or who have been 
observing a deterioration in their "state". These firms tend to have relatively low values 
of x* (x in the active exploration model) in the period prior to failure and are on average 
the firms with efficiency values closest to the exit level of efficiency, Xq.
If efficiency and size are positively related, as they are for PMFs, then firms about to fail 
will on average have relatively smaller operating scales. For the LMF the efficiency-size 
relationship is indeterminate and we are unable to draw any conclusions on the 
relationship between size and survival probabilities.
Table 2
Surviving v. Failing Firms of the Same Cohort
PMF LMF
LABOUR Survivors > Failures Indeterminate
CAPITAL Survivors > Failures Indeterminate
OUTPUT Survivors > Failures Indeterminate
Table 3
Surviving Firms of the Same Cohort 
Across Ownership Form
PMF LMF
LABOUR > LMF twin < PMF twin
CAPITAL > LMF twin < PMF twin
OUTPUT > LMF twin < PMF twin
d/dx* (x*q) > 0 ;
-* 0  as x*->a2
< PMF twin, but < >0 
in sign; -* 0  as x*-*a2
LARGEST FIRMS g -* o g Indeterminate
SMALLEST g Indeterminate g Indeterminate
MEDIUM g > 0 g Indeterminate
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Table 4
Surviving Firms of the Same Size 
Across Ownership Form
PMF LMF
GROWTH (K) -* 0 with Age -> 0 with Age
(% CHANGE) > 0  before -» 0 > < 0  before -* 0
GROWTH (L) Same as above Same as above
GROWTH (Q) Same as above Same as above
-* 0 with Age -> 0 with Age
-» 0 with Age -* 0 with Age
02 Q -» 0 with Age -» 0 with Age
FAILURE Declines with Age Declines with Age
PROBABILITY
Table 5
Surviving Firms of the Same Age
PASSIVE LEARNING ACTIVE EXPLORATION
DEPENDENCE 
ON INITIAL SIZE
Remains with passage 
of time
Dissipates with passage of 
time
Table 3 
Proposition 2
Taking a matched sample o f PMFs and LMFs and looking at surviving firm s o f  the 
same cohort, PMFs will tend to use more labour and more capital to produce more 
output than twin LMFs o f  the same true efficiency, receiving identical shocks.
The model predicts that for identical firms receiving the same shocks, the PMF will 
always be larger in terms of both inputs and outputs than the LMF twin. Empirically, 
however, this prediction is difficult to test since many shocks are in fact idiosyncratic to 
the firm and it is therefore never possible to observe two identical firms of different 
ownership forms.
Proposition 3
Taking a matched sample o f PMFs and LMFs, surviving PMFs o f  the same cohort will 
tend to grow positively over time, while the predicted growth-age relationship fo r  LMFs 
is indeterminate.
Surviving firms in both cases are those which on average have been receiving favourable 
information (or have been moving to better states). These firms have been revising their 
value of x* (or x in the active exploration case) upwards over time. If efficiency and size 
are positively related, as they are for the PMF, upward revisions in efficiency will entail 
upward revisions in size, and therefore positive growth rates. For the LMF, the 
ambiguity of the efficiency-size relationship means we can make no prediction on the 
average sign of growth rates over time.
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Proposition 4
Taking a matched sample o f surviving PMFs and LMFs o f  the same age, PMF growth 
rates will on average be positive fo r  surviving small firms, approaching zero fo r  larger 
sizes. The theory can make no prediction on the relationship between growth and size 
fo r  the LMF because o f the indeterminacy o f the efficiency-size relationship.
The upper bound on firm efficiency means that PMF size is bounded from above. 
Smaller surviving PMFs are on average receiving favourable information on their 
efficiencies, and are therefore on average growing positively. Because the efficiency-size 
relationship is indeterminate for the LMF, we are unable to make any similar predictions 
on the growth-size relationship for these firms.
Table 4 
Proposition 5
Regardless o f ownership form, surviving firms have growth rates o f  inputs and outputs 
which approach zero fo r  old firms.
This is the first of four predictions of the learning models which are unaffected by the 
change in ownership form, as the predictions arise from the nature of learning and do not 
depend on the efficiency-size relationship. In terms of the passive learning model the 
intuition is simple: the firm’s efficiency is stationary over time, and as the firm has more 
and more observations on which it bases its expectation of x*, the more precise its 
estimate becomes and the less it changes with each subsequent observation. If x* does 
not change much, then output revisions are smaller as well.
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In terms of the active exploration model, over time the firm’s idea eventually becomes 
fully exploited and it is no longer possible to move to better states. (The exception is if 
the firm comes up with new ideas.) In the long run, all ideas become outdated as newer 
and better ideas emerge, and the firm who does not innovate will die. However, in the 
medium to long run, once the firm’s idea has been fully exploited and before it has been 
overtaken, the firm may remain in the same state for a long time before it begins to 
decline. Thus growth rates will approach zero as the firm’s state ceases to change.
Proposition 6
The growth rate o f inputs and output fo r  the PMF will tend to he positive before 
approaching zero with age. For the LMF\ due to the indeterminacy o f  the efficiency- 
size relationship, the theory is unable to make any predictions on the sign o f  growth 
rates before the convergence to zero occurs.
Because survivors tend to be revising their estimates of x* upwards, and efficiency is 
positively related to size for PMFs, surviving PMFs are on average growing positively. 
Without an unambiguous sign on the efficiency-size relationship for LMFs, the theory can 
not determine whether growth rates for these firms will on average be positive or 
negative.
Proposition 7
The variance o f firm s9 inputs and output declines with age fo r  both LMFs and PMFs. 
This follows from Proposition 5 and is the second of the four predictions of the learning
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models unaffected by the change in ownership form. As the state of the firm stabilises 
at a certain level, changes to inputs and output become smaller, so the variance of inputs 
and outputs declines.
Proposition 8
For surviving firms o f  the same size, the likelihood o f  failure declines with age fo r  both 
PMFs and LMFs.
This is the third of four predictions of the learning models that do not depend on the 
organisational form of the firm. As the firm’s state stabilises at a certain level with age, 
the likelihood of a big enough shock to throw the firm into the failure zone is less. In 
terms of the passive learning model, it would take a particularly disastrous draw for a 
single observation to force a drastic enough revision in x* to force the firm to close. 
Similarly, it would require a drastic outcome to investment by the firm or by its 
competitors to send the active exploration firm into liquidation.
Proposition 8: Corollary
The learning models assume that upon entry the firm sets its expectation of its efficiency 
equal to the mean value of the distribution from which efficiencies are drawn. If, 
however, we assumed entrants were "optimistic", in the sense of setting initial 
expectations above the mean of the efficiency distribution, then we would observe the 
following: For a given cohort in the initial few years many firms would be revising their 
expectations downwards, but in very few cases will these revisions be large enough to 
induce exit. After the first few years have passed, most of the truly inefficient firms
which are still alive will have expectations near the exit threshold. From this point on, 
further bad news will induce exit in large numbers and for the remaining firms survival 
likelihoods will be increasing in age. Thus the survival-age relationship will be initially 
downward sloping, reaching a minimum after some period of time, and rising thereafter.
Table 4 
Proposition 9
The ratio o f  current period size (t) to last period size (t-1) and size (t-k) periods ago will 
not depend on size (t-k) under the active exploration model. Under passive learning, 
it will.
See Proof of Theorem 3.
8. Summary and Conclusion
The clear and sharp predictions of the evolutionary learning models of Jovanovic and 
Ericson and Pakes become indeterminate when the ownership structure of the firm is 
assumed to be "Illyrian" labour management. The Jovanovic and Ericson and Pakes 
results are shown to depend principally on the establishment of a positive efficiency-size 
relationship, and it has been shown that this relationship becomes ambiguous when the 
LMF organisational structure is assumed. Furthermore, we have shown that at least one 
example exists where this relationship is unambiguously negative.
The predictions of the learning models are: above the exit threshold, LMF output will lie 
below that of an identical PMF of the same efficiency receiving the same shocks; both 
types of firm will close down at the same efficiency level of zero present value (net of
opportunity cost) of remaining in business; at the point of closure, both firms will be 
employing the same level of inputs and producing the same level of output; and finally, 
the Pakes and Ericson (1990) test of the passive learning versus the active exploration 
models of firm growth also holds for the case of the LMF, and is therefore unaffected 
by the internal organisational assumptions made here.
Most of the empirical predictions of the learning models collapse due to the 
indeterminacy of the LMF efficiency-size relationship. Only a small number of the 
predictions are unaffected by the change in ownership form: (1) Surviving firms have 
growth rates approaching zero with age; (2 ) the variance of inputs and output for all 
firms declines with age; (3) the likelihood of failure declines with age for firms of the 
same size; and (4) the Pakes and Ericson test holds for both types of firm.
For the LMF, the theory is unable to provide unambiguous predictions on a number of 
the more interesting empirical relationships that it predicts for the PMF. These include: 
(1) the relation between efficiency and output; (2 ) the relation between efficiency and 
inputs; (3) the relation between survival and output; (4) the relation between survival and 
inputs; (5) the relation between growth and age; (6 ) the relation between growth and 
output; (7) the relation between growth and inputs; and (8 ) the sign of growth rates for 
younger surviving firms.
There may be at least three possible explanations for the contrast in the results between 
the two types of firm: First, the Illyrian firm model has been attacked in many studies 
for being overly simplistic relative to the actual organisational structure of these firms.
In particular, under the perverse short run supply response it does not provide a satisfying 
solution to the problem of how the firm decides which workers will go, and how these 
workers will be compensated. Furthermore, it does not allow for the complex rules and 
regulations which govern the behaviour of these firms in the Western world. This 
explanation is addressed and rejected in the next chapter, which develops a model specific 
to the French system of producer cooperatives. A second explanation is that these firms 
in fact behave substantially differently from profit maximising firms, and this is being 
reflected in the indeterminacy of the comparative statics results. However, as will be 
seen in Chapter IV, the empirical behaviour of these firms is remarkably similar to 
conventional profit maximising firms. The third possible explanation is that the 
theoretical models are structured in such a way as to overemphasize the internal structure 
of the firm to the neglect of more basic and fundamental factors. This latter explanation 
is addressed in the final chapter of this thesis.
In addition, the structure of the model presented here presumes that it is greater 
efficiency which leads some LMFs to operate at a smaller size. However, plausible 
stories involving agency problems or transactions costs may imply a reverse causality: 
i.e., it is precisely because some firms are smaller that they have lower costs and are 
therefore more efficient. The direction of causality between efficiency and size is 
addressed in some further detail in Chapter V.
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APPENDIX: Proof of Theorem 1
We restate the objective function of the PMF:
a 2m *
Max F  P‘/ [ i t (* V x t+(X,-i-xP®],^ (* * ,= sK ^ t)<*
~  ■>
(A l)
At the point of exit, the firm is indifferent between remaining in business and exiting. 
If it exits, Xr= 0 so (Al) reduces to:
Vx = Q
Equating (Al) and (A2):
We restate the objective function of the LMF:
Equating (A4) and (A5):
(A2)
CM
Y  P '/[* (V x « +( x » - rx P ® W * \=sl;v * , ) * =® (A3)
t=x «
Max Z'= Y, P 'f [J > (* *)X,+( X , - . +(1 - x M •
<-< t, Lt-1
P (x 't=s\X',nJds (A4)
At the point of exit the firm sets xr= 0 so (A4) reduces to:
z  =—  + y  p y
1 i t -, £  * (A5)
Comparing (A6 ) with (A3) it is clear that the only time these two equations will be 
identical is when the firm fails in period t= r . In that case, L ^ L ^ ,  and (Dt-wJL^ = 
(Dr-wT)LT.1} but since the firm fails, Lr is not revised from LtA so Lt= L m . But (DT- 
wt)L t= xt so (A6 ) reduces to (A3).
CHAPTER III: A Membership Model of the French Producer Cooperative*
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Ben Ner, and Mark Schankerman for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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1. Introduction
The Illyrian firm model of the labour managed firm, where an all-member firm 
maximises profits per worker, is the most commonly used objective function in the 
literature. Yet this objective function has been criticised for being overly simplistic and 
for ignoring the complex network of rules and constraints which typically govern the 
behaviour of these firms. This paper will present a model of producer cooperatives in 
France which incorporates most of the institutional rules that govern the behaviour of 
French labour managed firms. We will show that the implications of this more 
complicated model are strikingly similar to the Illyrian firm model, and under certain 
conditions the model simplifies into an identical version of the Illyrian firm model.
In terms of the dynamics of firm growth and survival, Chapter II showed that the strong 
positive efficiency-size relationship of the Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1989) 
models becomes indeterminate when the Illyrian type of internal organisation of the firm 
is assumed. In fact, under certain plausible assumptions this critical efficiency-size 
relationship becomes negative. This chapter addresses and rejects the possibility that the 
sharp theoretical predictions for profit maximisation break down because of the Illyrian 
firm model’s neglect of the actual institutional rules and regulations governing these 
firms, and we find that the more complicated French cooperative model here behaves 
remarkably similarly to the Illyrian firm model in Chapter II.
The model of the French producer cooperative will, however, provide explanations for 
a number of unexplained stylized facts in the literature on labour managed firms. First, 
a great deal of anecdotal evidence along with empirical findings by Ben Ner (1988a) and 
Pdrotin (1986) suggest that worker cooperatives have lower hazard rates than 
conventional capitalist firms (See Appendix). The principal explanation to date has been 
that cooperatives benefit from higher efficiency due to the internalisation of conflict 
between workers and owners (Ben Ner, 1988a), better flow of information, and higher 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital due to longer worker time horizons (Estrin, 
Jones, and Svejnar, 1987). In the case of cooperatives formed from bankrupt capitalist 
firms, it has been argued that workers may be willing to give up some earnings in 
exchange for avoiding the search process for new jobs (Ben Ner, 1988a). All these 
explanations provide support for worker cooperatives having lower failure thresholds than 
capitalist firms, by relying on empirically nonmeasurable influences on the failure 
threshold. This paper will use the Jovanovic passive learning framework to provide an 
explanation on a purely pecuniary basis why French cooperatives will remain in business 
over a range of conditions where both conventional firms and Illyrian labour managed 
firms will exit.
A second stylized fact in the LMF literature is that although much has been written in 
theoretical papers about the degeneration hypothesis1 (Ben Ner, 1984, Miyazaki, 1984), 
whereby successful cooperatives degenerate into capitalist firms by replacing departing 
members with cheaper hired workers, very few conversions are actually observed. In
lrThe degeneration hypothesis is explained in greater detail in the appendix on labour 
management at the end of the thesis.
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fact, Estrin and Jones (1988) test and reject the degeneration hypothesis for French 
producer cooperatives. Yet no explanation has been offered why degeneration should not 
occur. In the French producer cooperative model presented here, we will show that 
degeneration is theoretically impossible given the rules which govern the behaviour of 
these firms, and therefore it is not surprising that the degeneration hypothesis should be 
rejected in empirical testing.
Four key features of the French system are incorporated into our model: first, the 
remuneration system, which is in fact much more complicated than the simple profits per 
worker rule; second, the Free Access Rule, which enables uninhibited conversion of 
status between member and nonmember workers within the firm by the purchase or sale 
of membership shares at face value; third, the financing system of the firm with internal 
and external financing considered separately; and fourth, the shutdown rules which 
specify that any residual value over and above the outstanding capitalization may never 
revert to the members themselves.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five further sections. Section 2 outlines the 
existing laws governing French cooperatives, while section 3 provides an introduction to 
passive learning. The passive learning model of the Illyrian firm is reviewed in Section 
4, and the passive learning model of the French producer cooperative is presented and 
compared to the Illyrian firm model in Section 5, and the solution is worked out in 
section 6 . The final section summarises and concludes.
2. French Cooperative Law
French law on cooperatives dates back to the 19th century, but the main law governing 
their behaviour is the law of July 1978. French law places a large number of restrictions 
and requirements on the operations of producer cooperatives.2 We will focus here on 
the four main institutional rules which we consider most influential in determining the 
behaviour of these firms: (1) the worker remuneration rules, (2) the Free Access rule, 
(3) capitalization rules, and (4) the shutdown conditions.
2.1 Remuneration of Workers
The workforce of the French producer cooperative can be divided into two distinct 
groups: worker-members and "hired” workers. There are two main distinctions between 
these two classes: (1) members participate democratically in the firm’s decision making 
structure while nonmembers have no voice; and (2 ) members hold ownership shares in 
the firm which entitle them to participate in any surplus produced.
All workers are paid a fixed wage, whether they are members or nonmembers. In 
addition, a portion of profits is paid out to all workers, both member and nonmember.3 
The remaining surplus is then divided among members only, on a per share basis. 4
2The rules and regulations are listed in 400 detailed pages in Guide Juridique des 
SCOP. 1988, Syros, Paris.
3By law, overall profitsharing must represent at least 25% of net revenues. 
Profitsharing portions paid to each worker normally reflect the relative contribution of 
the worker in terms of time worked and output produced. However, we will be 
considering a homogeneous workforce so this factor will not be significant to the model.
4The dividend payments may not exceed total profitsharing payments to labour, and 
the actual rate of return may not exceed 8.5% or the nominal rate of return on corporate 
bonds issued in the previous six months, whichever is higher.
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This differs from assumptions made in the existing labour managed firm (LMF) 
literature, where either workers in an all-member firm simply share the surplus, or in the 
case of hired-workers being present, hired workers receive a fixed wage and the 
remaining member-workers share the surplus.
The remuneration rules are significant in terms of modelling because nonmember workers 
have profitsharing earnings rather than just a fixed wage. Thus if the firm is profitable, 
all workers may receive earnings in excess of their opportunity cost given by the 
capitalist wage.
2.2 Free Access
While the literature on the degeneration of labour managed firms (Ben Ner, 1984, 
Miyazaki, 1984) has extended the Illyrian model to address the issue of hired workers in 
the firm, it has neglected one essential point. In the French case, and in certain other 
countries, nonmember workers may at any time elect to purchase membership shares 
and become members in the firm, and the firm  must accept them. Likewise, members 
may at any time redeem their membership shares at face value and become nonmember 
workers in the firm.
The essential theoretical outcome of Free Access is that it forces the two classes of 
workers to earn (ex ante) exactly the same amount; otherwise, any gap in earnings will 
be eroded by the conversion of workers from one class to another.
2.3 Capitalization
Capitalization is defined as the outstanding value of all equity shares. For the French 
producer cooperative these shares are always priced nominally. When the firm is created 
the founding members bring the initial capital with them, and they are allocated shares 
based on their contribution to the total stock. The share price is set at this time. If the 
firm earns positive rents, this is not reflected in an appreciation of the share price; it 
simply means there will be a higher dividend. However, if the firm makes losses this 
will result in a downward revision of the share price unless there is a capital infusion.5
The addition of new members and the departure of existing members both result in 
changes in the firm’s capitalization but leave the share price unchanged. This is because 
new members must pay the nominal share price to purchase at least one share, thereby 
injecting new capital into the firm. Departing members redeem their share(s) at nominal 
value, thereby reducing the firm’s capitalization.
Once again this feature differs from assumptions made in the existing literature. Even 
where the share price has been incorporated into modelling, it has been a mechanism to 
reflect the value of the firm, freely traded between workers with the price set in an 
internal market. However, at least in the French system, shares can only be bought from 
and sold to the firm itself, and by law, all transactions involving these shares must be 
made at face value.
5By law, the share price must always be kept within the 100 FF to 500 FF range. 
There are also restrictions on the maximum percent of shares a single member may own 
at any time.
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The capitalization rules are significant in that the outstanding value of the firm’s equity 
changes with changes in the level of membership. In the case of internal financing, it 
links the firm’s capital input to the level of membership.
2.4 Shutdown Procedure
If the firm disbands, the nominal value of shares owned are paid to members but any 
remaining residual profit must revert to the umbrella cooperative organization (CG- 
SCOP) 6 or be paid to another producer cooperative, but may under no circumstances be 
paid to the individual members. The key outcome of this rule is that profits in excess of 
the firm’s capitalization are nonrecoverable in the event of shutdown, so all else equal 
the French producer cooperative will remain in operation over a range of circumstances 
where the Illyrian firm and capitalist firms would shut down.
Compared to the Illyrian firm model, this framework provides a much more realistic 
picture of how the LMF operates in France. The next step is to present a general model 
of the dynamics of firm growth and failure using the special case of the French producer 
cooperative. We will consider here the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982), 
which belongs to a class of models which establish a positive relationship between 
capitalist firm efficiency and firm size.
3. Passive Learning
The passive learning framework developed by Jovanovic and applied in Chapter II to the 
Illyrian model of the labour managed firm is based on the notion that all firms are bom
Confederation Generate des Socidtds Cooperatives Ouvrteres de Production.
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with a certain efficiency endowment which remains constant over time. However, this 
efficiency endowment is not revealed to the firm; the firm only knows the underlying 
distribution from which it is drawn. The model is set up so that uncertainty over 
efficiency is the only source of uncertainty to the firm. The firm develops expectations 
on its efficiency by observing its own sequence of sales, and in each period it uses the 
new information it receives to update its expectations. Under profit maximisation, the 
firm’s optimal choice of inputs and output are positively linked to efficiency.
If the firm’s expectation of its efficiency falls below a certain threshold, then the expected 
value of remaining in business falls below the opportunity cost, and the firm shuts down. 
The key result of the model is that a relationship exists between the pattern of growth and 
failure and the size and age of firms.
To formalise the model, we assume all firms have the same cost functions which are U- 
shaped for all input prices, and production functions which are locally concave.7 The 
key difference between firms is in their relative efficiencies in producing sellable output. 
The differences in relative efficiency are manifested through a firm-specific multiplicative 
factor applied to the production function. The efficiency endowment may be thought to 
represent a firm-specific wastage rate, managerial ability, technology choice, firm 
location or any other firm-specific efficiency factors which remain constant over time.
The modelling strategy is to provide the firm at birth with an unknown time-invariant 
efficiency parameter labelled 0. The firm’s expectation of this efficiency parameter
7See Ireland and Law (1982) pp. 27-28.
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determines its scale of operations. Growth and failure are then modelled as outcomes of 
a stochastic process involving the firm’s expectation of its 0 .
Since the firm is unaware of its 0 draw, it forms expectations on its 0 from its observed 
sales. The realisation of the firm’s sales provide it with a noisy estimate (r&) in each 
period of the true endowment (0), where the noise consists of zero mean i.i.d. shocks (q):
r\, = 0 + e,
6  -  m a g 2) 
e, ~ m a 2)
(3.1)
The firm bases its decision-making on the sequence rjt_2,..., ?h}. The et shocks are 
assumed to be firm-specific, and are independent over time and across firms.
The true (noiseless) relative efficiency multiple of the firm is labelled x, and is given by
the function x =  £(0), where £(0) > 0 , £'(0) > 0  and continuous, and lim £(0)=a1>O and
0- >  -00
lim £(0)= a 2 < 0 0  • That is, the multiple is always positive, (to preclude negative output), 
0- >  00
and is increasing in 0 ; i.e., the more efficient the firm is, the more sellable output it can 
get out of the same inputs. The upper bound a2 is needed to preclude infinite output. 
Since the firm is actually unable to observe 0, and in fact only observes rj, it develops 
expectations on the value of x(0 ) based on the observed sequence of {rj}.
The firm’s expected relative efficiency factor is a random variable denoted x*t and given 
by:
x\=E,[x | rl t_i.r|,-2>- >r|1]
(3.2)
-73-
The firm updates its expectations on its relative efficiency multiple by means of Bayes’ 
Law: in each period t, it estimates the probability of having a certain efficiency factor x 
given that it has observed to date the sequence of {i^, r?t.2, rji) noisy estimates of
9. It then revises its estimate of x* to correspond to the new expected value.
The evolution of x* is governed by the following probability function:
P (x '\x \ ,n J  = Pr(x =x * |x ’ =x \,n ,=n,)
(3.3)
The x*t sequence is a Martingale so all currently available information is incorporated in 
x*t. It follows that the current expectation of x* for all future periods is the current value 
of x*t:
Efx*t^ = x %  V*>0
(3.4)
Considering the two input case, the production function for firms in the industry is given 
by:y qt = q(KtiLt)
(3.5)
where % >(), ^ > 0 , feC O , q ix< 0 , and qLK=qKL> 0 .
In any given period, the expected sales revenues of the firm are given by the product of 
the output price, the production function, and the efficiency multiple x',:
= p?'fl(Kt,L)
(3.6)
The firm uses the information available to it to evaluate the expected discounted value
of future cash flows if it remains in business. This value is contrasted with the fixed 
opportunity cost, labelled #, and the firm operates only if the value of remaining in 
business exceeds $ . Because profits are monotonically increasing in efficiency, there is 
a single value of the expected efficiency factor, x*, at which the firm is indifferent 
between exiting and remaining. For all values below that critical value, the firm will 
choose to exit.
While this framework has been used almost exclusively to analyze the growth and 
survival behaviour of profit maximising firms, it can be adapted to study the behaviour 
of labour managed firms. Chapter II applied this framework to examine the behaviour 
of the Illyrian firm, and the findings are briefly reviewed in the next section.
4. The Passive Learning Model of the Illyrian Firm
Traditionally, the literature on labour-managed firms has adopted the objective function 
proposed by Ward (1958) and extended by Domar (1966) and Vanek (1970). Sometimes 
referred to as the Ward-Domar-Vanek objective function, it is assumed that workers in 
a cooperative maximize member income, or "dividends", i.e., the rate of net revenues 
(after capital costs) per worker.
In the passive learning Illyrian firm model, all workers are assumed to be homogeneous 
and risk neutral expected earnings maximisers. The LMFs are assumed to operate in an 
economy dominated by conventional profit-maximising firms. All firms are price-takers 
in input and output markets. The capitalist sector employs workers at the market wage, 
and workers are able to move freely between the two sectors. Thus the worker’s
opportunity cost of working in an LMF is the capitalist wage, w. Capital is externally 
financed by all firms at the market rate, r. All price vectors, i.e., {pj, {rt}, and {wj 
are known in advance and are assumed to change at the same rate from one period to the 
next. In each period, the firm updates its expectations on its relative efficiency parameter 
and maximises the expected present discounted value of future earnings per worker. If 
the firm remains in business, this is given by the discounted value of the stream of future 
dividends; if it exits, it is given by the worker’s one-time share of the shutdown value, 
<£, plus the discounted value of the stream of future capitalist wages he will earn
D*t= expected single period dividend 
Kt= capital 
Lt= labour
nt= number of periods since firm was created 
x*t= expectation of firm efficiency at time t 
Xt = 1 if firm survives, 0 otherwise 
$ =  shut down value of firm 
wt= capitalist wage 
/?= discount rate
If the firm continues to operate, it chooses inputs to maximise single period dividends, 
given by expected revenues net of capital costs shared out among the workforce:
thereafter:
« , L t - 1
id€ A) P{x* =s\x* ^ n^ds
where (4.0)
and
Max D ( K ^ \ x \ , n %) =
p ,x \q ( K ^ ) - r ,K ,
(4.1)
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where:
pr= output price 
rT= cost of capital
The first order conditions become (omitting time subscripts):
px 'qk = r
(4.2)
and
px*q(KyL)-rK  n , px a . = - — -   = D
L (4.3)
Thus the firm chooses its capital input so that the marginal revenue product of capital 
exactly equals the cost of capital, like a conventional profit maximising firm. However 
it chooses employment so that the marginal revenue product of labour equals the 
dividend, which is not exogenous like the capitalist wage, but varies with changes in 
capital and labour employed by the firm.
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) can be solved simultaneously to yield:
q = LqL + KqK
(4.4)
Equation (4.4) is, of course, Euler’s Theorem. That is, the Illyrian firm only produces 
along those portions of the production function where there are constant returns to scale. 
This is a well known result in the literature on labour managed firms, and leads to a 
multiplicity of possible equilibriums if the production function exhibits constant returns 
to scale over a range of output levels (Ireland and Law, 1982, Estrin, 1982).
To determine the comparative statics of a revision in the expected efficiency multiple x*, 
we differentiate (4.2) and (4.3) with respect to x* yielding:
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Solving (4.5) and (4.6) simultaneously yields:
and
(4.7)
J L  =  >< o
^x * Qll4 k k ~ 4 l k  x *Qk k  x *
(4.8)
In both equations, the first expressions on the right hand side are strictly negative by the 
second order condition for maximum and the assumption of diminishing marginal returns. 
The second (bracketed) expressions are in both cases indeterminate in sign. In each case, 
the first of the two terms in brackets is negative and the second positive, causing the 
overall sign to be indeterminate. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that in its labour 
decision, the LMF balances the loss in dividends from having more workers sharing in 
profits, against the improvement in dividends from having more workers sharing capital 
costs.
With the capital and labour effects both indeterminate, it follows that the output effect, 
given by the efficiency-adjusted production function, will also be indeterminate:
The growth and survival predictions of the Jovanovic model and that of Ericson and 
Pakes for profit maximising firms were shown in Chapter II to depend delicately on 
establishing a positive efficiency-size relationship. It was suggested in Chapter II that the 
breakdown of the strong relationship found for capitalist firms may be attributable to the 
excessive simplicity of the Illyrian firm model. Indeed, the Illyrian firm model has been 
criticised for lacking any of the institutional detail typical of cooperative firms in practice. 
In particular it does not determine how the firm decides who will go if it contracts 
employment, it does not allow for nonmember labour and differing remuneration between 
the member and nonmember classes, nor does it incorporate the institutional rules that 
govern the internal structure of these firms. However, we will show that once all these 
features are included, the indeterminacy of the results still remains, and the more 
complicated version of the model bears a striking resemblance to the simpler and much 
more manageable Illyrian firm model.
5. The Passive Learning Model of the French Producer Cooperative
This section presents a model of the French producer cooperative incorporating the four 
conditions and constraints described in Section 2. But first, a number of new 
assumptions are needed: For convenience, the fixed wage paid to all workers is set to 
zero. 8 Furthermore, under the internal financing regime the firm uses its capitalization 
entirely to purchase the capital goods needed for production. Under external financing
8This has no impact on the results of the model.
the firm borrows at the market rate to finance capital expenditures, and invests the 
outstanding capitalization at the market rate r  on which it receives interest in each period. 
In both regimes, capital goods are bought and sold in a perfect second hand market with 
no fixed or sunk costs to the firm, as long as the firm remains in business.
5.1 Remuneration
The French cooperative’s net revenues are distributed in two9 parts: the first part is 
divided among all workers in the form of profitsharing; the remaining part is divided 
among all members in the form of return on shares.
Following French law, all workers in the firm receive in payment a certain fraction of 
revenues, regardless of whether or not they are members. We denote this fraction by 7 , 
where 0 < 7  < 1. The level of 7  is assumed to be set at the creation of the firm and 
remains constant thereafter.
Expected gross revenues are given by the product of the output price p, the expected 
relative efficiency multiple x*, and the production function, q. Under internal financing, 
revenues are distributed gross of capital costs. This is because all capital is owned by 
the firm and payments to capital and payments to labour are determined endogenously 
and simultaneously as part of the members’ earnings maximisation process. Then under 
internal financing net revenues, R1, are the same as gross revenues, and are given by:
^here  are also provisions requiring some of the surplus to go to various reserve and 
development funds which we ignore here.
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R \x % n ) - p t ' f l i K f L )
(5.1)
Under external financing, capital costs (rK) are exogenous and must be paid before 
earnings distribution. The firm receives additional earnings (rSM) from having invested 
the outstanding shares at rate r, so net revenues, RE, become:
R e(x \ ji)  = p ?  -rfc+rfiM '
(5.2)
The expectation of shared earnings for a typical worker in any period is given by E*, 
where (omitting time subscripts):
E ’ = -¥■«(* V»)
L (5.3)
where x* represents the Jovanovic expected efficiency multiple of the firm as discussed
in Section 3, y  is the portion of earnings shared among all workers, and n is the firm’s
age. R  represents net revenues under either financing regime.
The remaining fraction (1-y) of revenues is then distributed to members on a per share 
basis. The expected return per share, denoted r*g, is given by:
( i - Y )  ( 5 4 )
* = AB
where M is the number of members and S is the firm’s share price. The share price is 
assumed to be set when the firm is created and remains constant thereafter. 10 We let
10As will be seen, the firm only operates if it expects to earn a surplus. If the 
realised surplus is negative, this will be financed by means of lower realisations of the 
return on membership shares and profitsharing. Since revenues can never be negative, 
any operating losses will always be covered.
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r  denote the single market rate of interest at which both individuals and firms may lend 
or borrow funds. We assume all members borrow funds at this market rate of interest 
to finance the purchase of their membership shares. Furthermore, for simplicity we 
assume that because of collateral constraints each member only owns one share. 11 So 
in any period, the expected earnings of any given member, Z*, is given by the expected 
profitsharing of all workers, plus the expected return paid on the membership shares, less 
the cost of servicing the loan taken to purchase the membership share:
Z* = ^ R (x ’ji) + -  rS
L M
= - rS L M
(5.5)
5.2 Free Access
Next, we incorporate into the analysis the Free Access Condition. That is, any 
nonmember wishing to become a member may do so by borrowing funds externally to 
invest the price of a single share in the firm and acquire membership rights. Assuming 
workers are expected earnings maximisers, the implications of the Free Access Condition 
will depend on the difference between the incomes of members and nonmembers, which 
enters this model in the form of the (excess) return on membership shares.
For any choice of capital and labour, the Free Access Condition produces a Nash 
equilibrium in membership. In such an equilibrium, no members will wish to sell their 
shares to become nonmembers and repay their loans; i.e., membership will be internally
“Whether they own one share or the same finite number of shares makes no 
difference.
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stable. Likewise, no nonmember will wish to borrow funds on the open market to 
purchase a share in the firm and become a member; i.e., membership is externally 
stable. 12
Observation: For internal and external stability to hold, it must be the case that the 
return on the firm ’s shares exactly equals the market rate o f interest, i.e . , 13
(5.6)
R(x *.h) = r
MS
r* = ^  *,n)=
In terms of modelling the LMF, Free Access is probably the single most important 
institutional rule, and by itself it explains why cooperative degeneration is seldom 
observed in France. For degeneration to occur, the firm must be able to replace 
departing members receiving profitsharing with cheaper hired workers receiving a fixed 
wage, thereby increasing profits per remaining member. In terms of this model, 
members must be able to raise the return on membership shares, r*„ at the expense of 
the profitsharing accruing to all workers, E*. But under Free Access, the (ex ante) return 
on membership shares is always fixed at the market rate of interest, and although 
members can determine overall employment they are powerless to control the level of 
membership.
Result 1: In the French cooperative system, the Free Access rule prevents degeneration 
from occurring.
12The notions of internal and external stability of membership are drawn from the 
literature on cartels. See in particular, d’Aspremont et al. (1983).
13The exception is the case of an all member cooperative (p =  l) where members 
would indeed be able to maintain r*f> r  in equilibrium.
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5.3 Capitalization
French law requires shares to be priced nominally and for all outstanding shares to be 
fully subscribed to by members at any given time. 14 Members may at any time redeem 
their shares for their nominal value.
In practice, cooperatives raise financing in four ways: (1) retained earnings; (2) internal 
equity financing by selling shares to new or existing members; (3) loans from workers; 
and (4) loans from external sources.
The firm will only expand capital if the return on capital is above the market rate of 
return. But in that case r*s> r , so the expansion will be willingly financed by the 
conversion of nonmember to member labour until the marginal worker is indifferent 
whether or not to become a member, that is when r*,=r. Under risk neutrality if workers 
attach any value to participation they will always prefer to purchase membership shares 
rather than lend to the firm. And since capital financed through retained earnings can 
not be recovered in the event of shut down, workers always prefer internal equity 
financing to retained earnings. Thus in this model the firm will always use internal 
equity financing until it has exhausted the credit capacity of its members. Only at this 
point will the firm resort to external financing.
However, under Free Access for the firm to resort to external financing it necessarily 
means that (1) no nonmember workers remain who can buy up new equity, i.e., M=L;
14For certain types of firm there is a lag between the time shares are issued and the 
time by which they must be subscribed to. We abstract from these exceptions here.
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and (2) the firm still expects to earn a marginal return on capital above r. Thus we 
arrive at the following result:
Result 2: The ex ante cost o f  capital fo r  the French producer cooperative is always 
equal to the market rate o f  interest.
As long as membership falls short of employment, the firm will always use internal 
equity financing, and the cost of capital will be r*s=r. Once membership equals 
employment, the firm will use external financing if it seeks to achieve further capital 
expansion, and the cost of capital will still equal r.
Here we will consider the case where the membership is less than employment and the 
firm uses internal equity financing. We will return to the external financing case in 
Section 6 . If the firm raises capital for investment through internal equity financing and 
shares are fully redeemable at nominal value, then at any time the sum of the value of 
all shares outstanding (MS) should exactly equal the current economic value (adjusted for 
depreciation and inflation) of the capital stock. 15 This leads to the Internal Financing 
Condition:
K  = MS (5-7)
where
M = number of members 
K = capital stock
15This would not be true if we included raw materials in the production function as 
another variable input. In this simple model investment is only in capital assets which 
can be sold to generate the cash necessary to pay redemptions on shares. Depreciation 
of the capital stock and inflation in the price of capital goods could be treated in this 
model via adjustments in the nominal share price.
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S = share price
Because only members of the labour managed firm participate in decision making, these
earnings given their expectation of the firm’s relative efficiency. With M < L  we can 
combine the Free Access and Internal Financing Conditions (5.6) and (5.7) to get:
That is, since capital is fully financed by membership shares, the funds expended on 
capital must exactly equal the funds expended on membership share dividends.
If exit does not occur, current period earnings, Z, subject to internal financing and free 
access are given by equations (5.5) and (5.8):
rr Y * rK nZ  = —px q + —  -  rS
l  M  (5.9)
This is to be contrasted with the Illyrian model current period dividend, in equation (4.1):
D = p x 'q -rK  
L
Subtracting (4.1) from (5.9) to compute the difference between the French cooperative 
and Illyrian firm earnings per member:
members will choose the level of capital and labour in each period to maximise their own
rK = (1-y )px*q
(5.8)
rK rS p x 'q  | rK
M L L
(5.10)
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In an equilibrium with internal financing, rK= (l*7 )px*q, and K=MS, so (5.10) reduces 
to:
Z-D  = r(— -S -—+—)
M L L
= °  (5.11)
Result 3: Although the earnings fo r  the French cooperative worker are split between 
profitsharing and return on membership shares, in equilibrium the member’s ex ante 
earnings exactly equal the Illyrian firm ’s ex ante dividend.
Lemma: Cooperative earnings (Z) are comprised o f  profitsharing (E) and the net return 
on membership shares (rMS), with the net return equal to zero in equilibrium. 
Therefore, i f  cooperative earnings (Z) equal the Illyrian dividend in equilibrium, then 
cooperative profitsharing (E) equals the Illyrian dividend as well.
5.4 The Shutdown Condition
We set the opportunity cost, $ , of remaining in business equal to zero in accordance with 
French law which specifies that upon closure, any residual left after refunding the face 
value of all shares may never be paid back to the members.
Since in equilibrium members and nonmembers will always earn the same net income, 
and the residual value of the firm does not accrue to members, the firm will exit from 
the industry if the expected discounted value of future earnings from remaining in 
business falls below the present discounted value of receiving the opportunity wage, w:
m  *  m
E  P '/ z ( * > , )  P ( x ' = s \ x \ s J &  < E  P X (5.12)
The Illyrian firm will exit when the expected discounted value of future cash flows per 
worker falls below the present discounted value of receiving the opportunity wage, w, 
plus a one-off payment comprising the worker’s share of the shut down value:
From Result 3, we know that the French cooperative earnings, Z, and the Illyrian firm 
dividend, D, are equal. Then the only difference between equations (5.12) and (5.13) 
is the inclusion of the term $/LM on the right hand side in (5.13). This additional term 
results in a higher exit threshold for the Illyrian firm, and therefore we should observe 
the French producer cooperative remaining in operation over ranges of the efficiency 
parameter where the Illyrian firm would exit.
H * 09
E  P '/  *> (*> ,) < E  P V - ^ (5.13)
Ranges of Expected Efficiency Factor
Over Which Firms Operate
11lyrIan f i rm e x i t s ;
All F f rms ex 11
French PC operates
AI I Firms Operate * 
X
0
a X X a21 1 2
Figure 1
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Result 4: The exit threshold fo r  the French producer cooperative will lie below that o f  
the Illyrian firm , and also that o f  the capitalist firm, since the latter two firm s are able 
to recover the shutdown value o f  $  while the French cooperative can not.
6. The Model Solution
6.1 Internal Financing
Under passive learning and internal financing the cooperative firm’s objective function 
and constraints (equations (5.5) and (5.8)) become:
(6.D
2
Max Z \  = £  p '/<  [ ( f +±3-) -  r N x . + d - x H  '
«•» L> p A
id€ A) P(x *t=s \x *x,nx)ds
where d  =
s t. r £ t =
where:
pt = output price 
Kt = capital 
Lt = labour 
pt =  membership ratio 
St = share price
7  = share of revenues distributed to all workers, 
constant
rt = capital market lending and borrowing rate 
wt = capitalist wage
nt = number of periods since firm was created 
(3 = discount factor
Xt = 1 if the firm operates in period t, zero otherwise
The firm will remain in operation if and only if the value of remaining in business 
exceeds the opportunity cost:
Zt(x V t|x ,= l) a E P ,w ,  (6 2)
It should be noted that the members are not concerned that in any resulting equilibrium, 
they may become nonmember workers. This is because in equilibrium, members and 
former members becoming nonmembers will expect to earn exactly the same income. 
It follows from the fact that in equilibrium r*s= r  by the Free Access Condition, so the 
member’s return on shares exactly covers the cost of servicing his loan, i.e ., the expected 
excess return on membership shares is zero. Furthermore, the shared expected earnings 
E* is by definition equal for members and nonmembers. So by maximising his income 
as a member, the member is implicitly maximizing his income if he were to become a 
nonmember as well.
The worker must worry, however, that if he becomes a nonmember, and some workers 
are fired, that he may be one of those who are fired. 16 This possibility is partially 
precluded by the internal financing assumption that there are always some nonmembers 
and that members always vote to fire nonmembers before former members. To 
completely exclude this possibility, we assume further that there are always enough 
nonmembers in the current period to ensure the safety of the position of the former 
member. In future periods the expected value of the revision of x* is always zero since 
all currently available information is incorporated into x \  Thus the risk neutral worker 
does not anticipate a need for any future cutbacks and is not worried about losing his job.
16Brewer and Browning (1982) show that in a profitable all member labour managed 
firm where members first vote whether to lay off workers, and then lay off these workers 
randomly, members may choose not to reduce membership at all even if this would raise 
earnings per head for remaining members.
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To solve the problem of the French cooperative member, we rewrite (6 .1) (conditional 
on no exit) in Lagrangian form:
Max 9£ =(—+^ —t-)px*q -  rS + X(rK-(l-y)px*q)
L  p L
( 6  3)
The maximisation problem yields the following three first order conditions:
l ( p x 'q L- ^ ) - \ ( l - v ) p x ' q L = 0  
oL L L
H  = ^ p x ' q K +a.[/--(i-y)p*,9jc]= o
dK L
^  -  r K -  (1-y )px'q  = 0
CM
(6.4)
(6.5)
(6.6)
In (6.4), the addition of a new worker raises the revenues to be shared out among all 
workers by the (expected) marginal revenue product of labour (MRPJ, px*^. However, 
the increased revenues lead the expected return on membership shares to rise above the 
market rate of interest, leading the marginal nonmember to become a member. The 
return on the membership share of the new member becomes a new cost, so a fraction 
(l-y) of the MRPl of the last worker goes towards covering this cost. And of course, 
the new worker himself must be paid his profitsharing as well. So in (6.4) the firm sets 
employment so that the increase in profitsharing due to the last worker is exactly offset 
by the cost of the profitsharing that must be paid to him plus the cost of financing the 
return on new membership shares purchases induced by his addition to the workforce, 
weighted by X, the shadow cost of capital.
Clearly this bears a close resemblance to the Illyrian firm employment condition (4.3) 
where the firm adds workers until the MRPL of the last worker exactly equals the profit 
sharing that must be paid to him. However, in the Illyrian firm model there is no 
feedback effect of employment on membership or on capital.
In choosing the level of capital in (6.5) the firm knows that the addition of capital also 
raises the revenues to be shared among all workers. But each new unit of capital will 
raise costs by the amount r, while only raising internal financing by (l-y)px*qK < r . So 
the firm adds capital until the marginal improvement to profitsharing due to the last units 
is exactly offset by the shortfall between the cost incurred for that unit (r) and the 
revenues generated by it for paying returns on shares, (l-y)px*qK, weighted by X, the 
shadow cost of capital.
In the Illyrian firm model, capital is externally financed so the MRPK is not diluted to 
finance new membership shares; the firm sets the MRPK exactly equal to the exogenous 
cost of capital, r, to maximise profitsharing.
Solving (6.4) and (6.5) for X and equating, the equations reduce to:
q -  LqL -  KqK = 0
(6.7)
This, of course, is Euler’s Theorem, which holds that the firm will only produce along 
those areas of the production function where there are constant returns to scale. Thus 
while the mechanisms for arriving at the result differ between the two models, the 
Illyrian firm and the French cooperative both choose their operating scale based on the
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condition of constant returns to scale.
Result 5: Under internal financing, the equilibrium operating scale fo r  the French 
producer cooperative satisfies the condition o f  constant returns to scale, which is 
identical to the case o f the Illyrian firm .
The comparative statics analysis on changes in x* yields the following system of 
equations:
co dL dK  dX _
Li** * ~dx dx dx
cp ^  + cp dK  dX _ p^
XL - * *-KK , ^Kk * a jEx*
dx ox ox
co dL dK  dX _ ^ p
L L -  ,  * -k K  _  „ ^  AA _  «, ~  Ax*
dx dx dx
(6.8)
(6.9)
(6.10)
But, =<^xx = 0> and 5£LL and 5^^ are both negative by the second order condition 
for maximum, is given by:
^Ax* = " ( 1 - Y )w  < 0
(6.11)
and by:
Sjct* = T PVk-T T  > 0
L LQl (6.12)
Using Cramer’s Rule we can solve for the effect of a change in x* on employment:
JL = _J_-i(i - Y)2 pixV[^A ]
ax* \ H \ L  LK (6.13)
aO i f  (Lq^+Kq^) aO 
< 0  otherwise
where H is the 3x3 bordered Hessian matrix, the determinant of which is negative by the 
second order condition. The employment effect is indeterminate since we can not 
determine the sign the expression (Lq^  + KqKK). The capital effect is also 
indeterminate:
—  = — ! - < - ^ ( i - y)2ott* \ B \ L  LK  (6.14)
aO i f  (L q u + K q ^i0 
< 0  otherwise
With both these effects indeterminate, the effect of an improvement in expected efficiency 
on efficiency-adjusted output is also indeterminate:
d  , * . dK dL— (* 9) = 9 + qK— +qL— -
d x ' dx' dx ' (6.15)
x  0
Result 6: Under internal financing and passive learning the firm ’s first order conditions 
are intuitively similar to the Illyrian firm  case; and identically to the Illyrian firm, the 
French cooperative chooses to operate under constant returns to scale in accordance 
with Euler*s Condition. The comparative statics o f  a change in x* on both inputs and
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output are indeterminate in both models.
6.2 External Financing
Under external financing we assume the firm borrows at the market rate r  to finance its 
capital expenditures and invests its outstanding capitalization at rate r  in the market. 
Constraint (5.7) is no longer binding, and since the firm is an all member firm the 
distinction between profitsharing and return on membership shares becomes irrelevant and 
all worker-members share the net revenues in equal proportions.
If the firm uses external financing, the French producer cooperative model collapses into 
the Illyrian firm model. Revenues to be shared are given by equation (5.2), so if the 
firm does not exit member income becomes:
Z(*vI) = (.-+— )(px 'q -rK+rSM) -rS
L M  (6.16)
But external financing is only used when M =L, so (6.16) reduces to:
Z(x'ji)  = ( I . +^ - ) ( p x  'q-rK+rSL) -rS  
L L
px*q-rK
L
(6.17)
which is exactly the Illyrian firm model.
Result 7: Under external financing, the objective function o f  the French producer 
cooperative is identical to that o f  the Illyrian firm.
The results are summarised in Table 1 below:
Table 1
French PC
Internal
Financing
French PC
External
Financing
Illyrian
Firm
Member Earnings Z*=D* (same) Z*=D* (same) D*=Z* (same)
Cost of K r*g = r (same) r (same) r (same)
Cost of L E*=D* (same) E*=D* (same) D*=E* (same)
Returns to scale 
chosen
constant constant constant
dL/dx*, 
dK/dx\ 
dq/dx* (x*q)
indeterminate indeterminate indeterminate
Exit threshold lower than Illyrian lower than Illyrian higher than 
French PC
Degenerates? no no yes17
Regeneration occurs in the version where hired workers receive fixed wage.
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7. Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that the efficiency-size relationship which is crucial to the 
Jovanovic and Ericson and Pakes growth and survival predictions remains indeterminate 
even when the institutional detail of a specific cooperative sector is considered. This 
suggests that either cooperative firms do in fact behave empirically substantially 
differently from conventional capitalist firms, or the theoretical structure of the models 
are imposing excessive emphasis on the internal organisation of the firm. Both these 
possibilities are addressed in later chapters.
The French producer cooperative model does, however, provide explanations for two 
stylised facts in the labour managed firm literature: First, the Illyrian firm model 
overestimates the failure threshold of these firms since it does not account for the 
nonrecoverability of the firm’s accumulated rents. This is the underlying explanation for 
the lower anecdotal and estimated hazard rates for cooperatives vis k vis capitalist firms;
i.e., it is the institutional rules which induce lower hazard rates for cooperatives relative 
to conventional firms rather than simply the willingness of workers to forgo income in 
exchange for participatory privileges.
The second stylized fact explained by the French producer cooperative model is the lack 
of any observed degeneration of French cooperatives into capitalist firms. We find that 
the free access condition is the main reason why very few conversions of cooperative 
firms to capitalist firms are in fact observed in France and the degeneration hypothesis 
is empirically rejected. This suggests that attempts to introduce nonmember workers into 
the simple Illyrian firm model without imposing institutional rules and constraints are
misleading, in that they lead to degeneration predictions which under free access to 
membership are theoretically impossible.
Otherwise, we find that the Illyrian model closely approximates the predictions of the 
French producer cooperative model. Both firms locate at the point(s) of constant returns 
to scale on the production function. Worker earnings under both models are identical. 
Under internal financing, the input and output responses of both models to an 
improvement in expected efficiency are indeterminate, and under external financing, the 
two models are exactly identical.
These findings provide a guarded defense for using the Illyrian firm model for theoretical 
work in labour management, provided empirical testing of the theoretical predictions are 
not done without regard to the institutional rules that govern the behaviour of the firms 
under analysis.
APPENDIX
Hazard Estimates: UK capitalist firms (CFs) and Worker Owned Firms (WOFs)
.4. Ben-Ner, Empirical observations on worker-owned and capitalist firms
0.175 r HAZARD ESTIMATES
0.150 F
0.125 b
JK CFs
0.100 b
0.075 u
<
rsi
< 0.050 b
JK WOFs
Taken from: Ben Ner, Avner, 1988, "Comparative empirical observations on worker 
owned and capitalist firms," International Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 6, page 
19.
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CHAPTER IV: An Empirical Study of the Pattern of French 
Producer Cooperative Survival and Growth*
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1. Introduction
The recent research on the dynamics of firm growth and failure has applied evolutionary 
learning models to generate predictions on the survival and growth of firms relative to 
their size and age (Jovanovic, 1982, Ericson and Pakes, 1989). All the theoretical and 
empirical work to date has focused exclusively on the case of the profit maximising firm. 
Chapters II and in  for the first time applied the evolutionary learning framework to the 
special case of the labour managed firm, to test the robustness of past results to 
alternative ownership forms. It was found that the sharp predictions derived for profit 
maximisation become indeterminate under labour management due to the sign ambiguity 
of the efficiency-size relationship. In Chapter III we were able to reject the possibility 
that the indeterminacy of the theoretical results under labour management stem from the 
excessive simplicity of the Illyrian firm model used in Chapter II.
This chapter presents estimates of the actual labour managed firm survival and growth 
relationships using a dataset of French producer cooperatives. In doing so we seek to 
determine whether these firms behave substantially differently from what has been found 
for conventional firms (Dunne, Roberts, Samuelson, 1989, Evans 1987a, 1987b, Hall 
1987) or if indeed the role of the internal organisation of the firm is being overstated by 
the theoretical models used in Chapters II and HI. We find that in spite of the 
indeterminate theoretical predictions, on the whole French producer cooperatives survive
and grow in much the same way as American capitalist firms. We also explore the 
impact of business cycle fluctuations on both the survival and the growth rates of firms 
across size and age classes.
Results indicate that French cooperatives’ survival rates are positively related to age after 
an initial period. This is consistent with past studies for conventional firms and with the 
predictions derived from theoretical models of learning and evolution applied to the case 
of the labour managed firm. The results show a positive relationship between survival 
and size, which is identical to past findings for capitalist firms, and inconsistent with a 
negative efficiency-size relationship. 1
The relationship between firm growth and size is found to be negative. This is consistent 
with past findings for conventional firms but in conflict with Gibrat’s Law, which holds 
that firm size and growth should be unrelated. If efficiency were negatively related to 
size, we would expect growth rates for surviving firms would on average be negative. 
Yet estimated growth rates here are consistently positive over almost all sizes. Firm 
growth is found to decline with age, similar to past findings for conventional firms, and 
consistent with theoretical predictions of learning models of firm growth.
Downswings in the business cycle are found to affect the survival of young firms far 
more adversely than older firms, and very small and very large firms far more than 
medium-sized firms. Additionally, macroeconomic slowdowns reduce growth rates for 
young and small firms by far more than old and large firms. Clearly these findings have
^ee  Chapter II.
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important implications for targeting public policy attempts to mitigate job losses in 
recessionary periods. In addition, they highlight the inadequacy of panel data estimation 
of these models with year dummies on the intercept alone, as has been the norm for most 
previous empirical work in this area.
Following the work of Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), Evans (1987a, 1987b), 
and Hall (1987), this chapter examines firm growth and survival jointly, in order to take 
account of sample selection bias induced by firm exit. However, this chapter differs 
from previous papers in that it also endogenises the firm’s decision on whether to report 
its accounts to the relevant authorities, thereby addressing potential sample selection bias 
from this source. Sample selection bias is found to be unimportant, since the distortion 
it creates is irrelevant to growth. Finally, this chapter uses a new approach to correct 
estimates for heteroscedasticity, a frequent problem in cross-sectional estimations 
involving size which, if not addressed, may lead to an overstating of the significance 
attached to coefficient estimates.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four further sections. Section 2 provides a 
description of the database used, while Section 3 outlines the theoretical models which 
this chapter sets out to test. Section 4 presents the empirical model and the results of the 
chapter. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Data
The data used in this study is a new panel dataset of French producer cooperatives, 
provided by the Confederation Gen6 rale des Socidtds Cooperatives Ouvrifcre de
Production (CG-SCOP). The panel spans the years 1979-1989, and includes a total of 
15,127 observations on 2,692 firms, with entry and exit occurring during all of these 
years. There are 781 firms in 1979, with the number rising to a peak of 1,661 in 1986, 
and falling steadily afterwards to 1,448 in 1989.
We examine the data in cross-sections, because the panel is neither rectangular nor 
continuous. The nonrectangularity arises from entry and exit of firms, while the 
noncontinuity arises from the incidence of missing values. Examining the data in cross- 
sections allows us to examine changes in the intercept and slope coefficients across the 
years, in order to determine the impact of business cycle fluctuations on the estimated 
relationships.
While estimations were performed for all the years in the sample for all the equations, 
the pattern of results were quite similar over the years. For this reason we report results 
for all the years in a separate appendix, and only include a single year’s results in the 
main text of the chapter. The year 1985 was chosen as the main year of analysis, since
BIRTHS AND DEATHS
FRENCH PRODUCER COOPERATIVES C1978-1989;)
*  OF 
3 50
FIRMS
JUU
2 50
2 00
150
100 - .........A- -
50
0
BIRTH AND DEATH RATES
FRENCH PRODUCER COOP BRAT IVE5 C1 9 7 8 -1 9 8 9 ]
79 79 00 01 02 03  04 05  06 07  00 09
Figure 1 Figure 2
-104-
it is approximately in the centre of the sample period and provides one of the largest 
number of observations to work with. The results for 1985 are fairly typical of the other 
years in the sample, as can be seen from the appendices to this chapter.
The amount of entry and exit in the dataset is considerable, as can be seen in Figures 1 
and 2, and Table 1. Entry peaks in 1982, and follows a declining trend thereafter. Exit 
rates peak in 1986, which is also the first year in our sample that the exit rate overtakes 
the entry rate, and the number of firms in the cooperative sector reaches its maximum.
Table I
Number of Birth Death
Year Firms* Births Rate Deaths Rate
1978 656 85 12.1% 44 6.3%
1979 781 125 16.0% 26 3.3%
1980 905 150 16.6% 33 3.6%
1981 1128 256 22.7% 72 6.4%
1982 1373 317 23.1% 100 7.3%
1983 1536 263 17.1% 131 8.5%
1984 1648 243 14.7% 228 13.8%
1985 1658 238 14.4% 140 8.4%
1986 1661 143 8.6% 250 15.1%
1987 1507 96 6.4% 137 9.1%
1988 1482 112 7.6% 127 8.6%
1989 1448 93 6.4% 133 9.2%
*For example, 781 firms existed at some point 
during 1979 of which 125 were created in 1979 and 
26 did not survive to 1980.
The variables in the dataset are of two types: first, the descriptive variables (industry, 
region, legal form, creation mode, year of creation and cessation2) which are constant 
over the length of the panel; and second, the accounting variables (labour force,
2Although we have no data on mode of closure, we were advised by CG-SCOP that 
all but two cases in the entire dataset were economic deaths, and those two cases were 
omitted.
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membership, and sales), which vary by year.3 There are no missing values in the 
descriptive variables, but there are numerous missing values in all the accounting 
variables.
2.1 Descriptive Variables
Industry: The firms in the dataset are categorized into 15 broad industrial categories, 
equivalent in most cases to 2-digit SIC categories, although some sectors with too few 
observations are grouped together. Traditionally, the largest industrial sector for 
cooperatives has been construction and construction-related activities. In the more recent
Industry Mix of French Cooperatives, 1985
Electronics 
4 . 1  X
Figure 3
years a new large sector has emerged in services. Cooperatives also exist in substantial 
numbers in printing, electrical and nonelectrical machinery, metals, transportation, and 
instruments. Smaller cooperative sectors are leather products, furniture and wood 
products, packaging, food and agricultural products, textiles, apparel, and miscellaneous
3There is also some data on profits, but these are so sparsely reported they are not 
empirically useful.
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manufacturing.
Creation mode: Most French cooperatives are created de novo, i.e ., from scratch; in any 
given year, the proportion of de novo firms in the population is between two thirds and 
three-fourths. Of the remaining firms about 10 percent are "mutations", created from 
firms with other ownership structures, and 25 percent are "reanimations", created from 
defunct cooperatives. In the first half of the panel, the rate of entry by reanimations is 
very high until about 1983, after which it declines. Some theories (Ben Ner, 1988a) 
suggest that during recessions increasing numbers of capitalist firms should convert to the 
cooperative form to avoid complete shutdown: As recession drives more and more 
capitalist firms to the brink of closure, workers in these firms are faced with the choice 
of entering the search for a new job in a worsening job market, or reorganising the firm 
as a cooperative and using the efficiency gain from the cooperative organisational form 
to help keep the firm afloat. Yet we see no apparent cyclical pattern in the share of 
mutation-entrants, which remains fairly constant in our sample in spite of the fact that the 
period was one of economic slowdown. It seems instead that prospective cooperative 
formers found it easier to revive defunct cooperatives or create new cooperatives than to 
convert distressed capitalist firms.
Region: The largest proportion of these firms are located in the Parisian area; in any 
given year the proportion of firms in Paris lies between one-fourth and one-third, 
although most recent entry has occurred outside Paris. The region definitions used in the 
estimations correspond to the eleven regional divisions of CG-SCOP.
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Legal form: All firms must adopt one of two legal forms at inception. They must 
choose between socidtd anonyme (S.A.) or societe & responsabilitde limitee (S.A.R.L.) 
The main difference between the two types is in the size limits on the firm: S.A.R.L. 
firms must always have between 4 and 50 members; their minimum level of capitalization 
is 25,000 francs; and most decisions are made by a manager elected by the membership. 
S.A. firms must always have over 7 members (with no upper limit on membership); 
capitalization must always exceed 125,000 francs; and most decisions are made by an 
administrative council elected by the members. Slightly less than half of all 1985 firms 
were of legal form S. A.
Table H
T-Test Results on Test of Equality of SA and SARL Means 
Testing H0: Means are Equal in 1985
Age 0-5
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
Age 5-9
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
Age 10-19 
Manuf actur ing 
Nonmanufacturing
Age 20-34
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
Age 35-50
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
Age 50+
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
SALES
-9.2333
-5.0327
-4.2139
-4.0573
-1.3804
-2.2422
-2.4555
-1.5742
-1.5025
N/C
-1.2410
N/C
EMPLOYMENT MEMBERSHIP
-14.2695
7.3930
-7.1831
-3.3808
-1.6889
-2.9365
-3.9351
-1.8919
-1.3304
-1.8839
-1.9446
N/C
-14.4578
-10.4559
-6.4823
-5.9838
-1.4998
-3.5587
-2.1895
-1.3714
-1.2116
-2.3470
-1.5867
N/C
N/C: Not computed; all firms were of same class.
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There are at least two important empirical points to keep in mind while using the 
S.A./S.A.R.L. distinction as a proxy for size. First, all large firms must be of type 
S.A.; however, not all small firms are of type S.A.R.L. This is because the smallest 
S.A. firms are smaller than some of the larger S.A.R.L. firms. In fact, a simple t-test 
on the hypothesis that mean size of the pooled data is equal between the S.A. and 
S.A.R.L. classes can not be rejected for any of the size variables (employment, 
membership and sales) in any of the years. Examining the data by age, Table II shows 
t-test results comparing means between S.A. and S.A.R.L. classes in 1985 by age 
grouping and for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing. Results indicated that for firms 
under 1 0  years old we accept the null hypothesis that the means are the same, but as the 
firms become older, there are increasingly more cases where we reject the null 
hypothesis.
It is important to note that firms decide at the time of formation which legal form to take, 
and firms choosing type S.A. must expect to eventually grow large, even if they are 
initially small. In terms of Table II, this can be interpreted in a number of ways. If 
there is asymmetric information between the firm and its creditors, the creditors may 
require time to accept that the firm has a good idea, whereas the firm itself believes its 
idea is good from the start and indicates its expectation to grow large by choosing the 
S.A. legal form. Thus the firm will initially be small due to capital constraints, but as 
time passes, it either fails or it proves itself to its creditors and is able to grow large. 
A second (complementary) interpretation of the legal form is as a proxy for sunk costs. 
A firm believing it is more efficient will be willing to incur larger sunk costs, perhaps 
to establish a larger capacity which it may not fully exploit initially until it has established
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a reputation for its product or business. As time progresses, it will expand production 
to increase its capacity utilisation. Unfortunately we have no data on capital or capacity 
utilisation for these firms to test this hypothesis, and it remains simply a plausible 
interpretation. However, in both these cases we would expect that as a cohort of firms 
ages, the difference between the means of surviving S.A. and S.A.R.L. firms should 
increase, as is suggested by Table n.
Age: For every firm in the sample we have a creation date, and if applicable, a closure 
date, so there are no missing values for age. The mean firm age in 1985 was about 11 
years, with the oldest firm 120 years old and 108 firms (6.5% of total) over 50 years old. 
The mere existence of so many old firms in the dataset raises doubts about the 
degeneration hypothesis, (Ben Ner, 1984, Miyazaki, 1984) which posits that over time 
successful cooperatives will necessarily degenerate into capitalist firms. In fact, the rules 
governing French cooperatives are such as to make degeneration extremely unlikely. 4
Because of the high rate of entry and the relatively high mortality rate of these firms, the 
resulting age distribution of the data is very skewed. The population is dominated by 
young firms, as can be seen from Figure 4. The firms are grouped according to whether 
they are under or over 20 years old. Firms under 20 are measured on the left hand axis, 
and the large number of young firms reflects the wave of entry that began in the late 
70’s. Looking at the firms over 20, measured on the right hand axis, the distribution of 
firms continues to follow a declining trend with age, although less consistently.
4See Chapter HI and Appendix on Labour Management.
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Age Distribution of French C o o p e r a t i 1985 
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2.2 Accounting Variables
Labour Force: Reported employment in the French cooperative sector was at 37,000 in 
1985, with the mean firm employing about 25 workers. Employment is measured at 
year-end, and is the most consistently reported of the accounting variables.
Membership: In the context of French producer cooperatives, a member is a worker who 
owns an equity stake in the firm. In addition to the fixed wage and variable profitsharing 
paid to all workers, members also receive a dividend on their membership shares. Out 
of the total 1985 reported employment of 37 thousand, almost 22 thousand workers were 
members. Like employment, membership is measured at year-end. However, the level 
of membership exhibits much less variability over the course of the panel than total 
employment. Among firms reporting both employment and membership, the membership 
ratio averaged 74 percent in 1985.
- I l l -
Sales: Sales are measured in thousands of 1980 French francs, and are deflated using 
French industry level producer price indexes. 5 The incidence of missing values in sales 
is substantially higher than for employment or membership. For those firms reporting 
sales in 1985, the mean value was about 6.5 million (1980) FF (about 1.5 million 1980 
US$) with a very large standard deviation of 20 million FF.
2.3 Missing Values
The incidence of the missing values appears to be nonrandom, with at least two apparent 
sources: first, it appears that in the initial few years following formation, firms are much 
less likely to report data than later; second, firms are much less likely to report in the 
years immediately prior to failure. The pattern of missing values suggests that there are 
certain substantial costs associated with either gathering and/or reporting data to CG- 
SCOP. Among the accounting variables, the incidence of missing values is worst for 
sales followed by membership and labour force. 6 Any estimations using data excluding 
these missing values risks introducing biases which must be modelled specifically.
Reporting in some years is clearly worse than others, since failing firms do not report, 
and the failure rate jumped in 1984 and again in 1986. Even excluding failing firms, in 
the last four years of the sample the incidence of missing values for employment and 
membership is altogether higher than before. In the same years, the differential in the
5In the retail sectors, the relevant consumer price index was used.
‘This pattern suggests that the cost of reporting is principally in the gathering rather 
than the reporting of the data, since presumably taking a head count of the number of 
workers at year end is much simpler than calculating overall sales. It may also reflect 
tax avoidance reasons.
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Table m
% of % of Values Missing in Survivors 
Firms -----------------------------------
Year
Failing Labour
Force
Member­
s h i p
Sales Sales
Growth
1979 3.3 3.5 11.4 15.7 36.7
1980 3.6 3.0 13.4 20.2 33.5
1981 6.4 2.8 10.0 19.5 38.0
1982 7.3 3.0 9.7 22.3 38.8
1983 8.5 3.2 9.3 23.2 37.7
1984 13.8 3.7 14.5 47.6 51.6
1985 8.4 3.2 14.6 30.1 58.5
1986 15.1 19.9 20.1 23.3 32.9
1987 9.0 16.5 16.6 20.2 30.0
1988 8.6 15.4 15.4 19.4 25.6
1989 9.2 16.1 16.1 18.9 24.3
reporting rates for employment and membership relative to sales declined substantially, 
with most firms apparently reporting everything or nothing at all.
3. The Theoretical Models
Theoretical work by Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1989) has modelled the 
process of firm growth and survival as part of an overall learning process whereby in 
each period the firm evaluates the new information it has on its long-term viability and 
decides whether or not to remain in business. If it remains, it chooses its operating scale. 
The main difference between the two models is that the Jovanovic "passive learning" 
model has the firm spending its life accumulating noisy information on its level of 
efficiency, which is stationary. The Ericson and Pakes "active exploration" model allows 
the firm to invest in order to improve its efficiency, but the outcome of these investments 
is stochastically driven. The level of efficiency for an active exploration firm is variable, 
and changes in response to the firm’s own investments, its rival’s investments, and shifts
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in market demand.
Both these models belong to a class of models which establish a positive linkage between 
firm efficiency and size for conventional profit maximising firms. This yields predictions
v
on the relationship between the firm’s current beliefs about its efficiency (proxied by 
size), and the likely sign and magnitude of revisions in those beliefs (proxied by the 
firm’s growth rate). Because over time, less efficient firms of a cohort will tend to exit, 
the mean efficiency of surviving firms will rise. This leads to further predictions 
between survival and firm size and age.
Chapters II and HI examine the impact of applying the passive learning model of 
Jovanovic and the active exploration model of Ericson and Pakes to the special case of 
the labour managed firm. Chapter II examines these models in the context of the Ward- 
Domar-Vanek "Illyrian" labour-managed firm, and finds the previously positive 
efficiency-size relationship for conventional firms becomes indeterminate under labour 
management.
Chapter III builds on the work of the second chapter by modelling the special case of the 
French producer cooperative, while building in the actual institutional rules and 
constraints under which it operates. In particular, it divides the labour force into member 
and nonmember workers, and models the remuneration of these workers explicitly, taking 
account of rules enabling nonmembers to convert to membership status and rules affecting 
the financing of the firm’s capital input. The theoretical relationship between efficiency 
and size is indeterminate, and identical to the Illyrian firm model. As a result, all the
empirical predictions of the French producer cooperative model regarding growth and 
survival are identical to the Illyrian labour managed firm.
Survival-Age: The predictions of the theoretical models in terms of the probability of 
firm survival vis k vis firm age are unaffected when the objective function of the labour 
managed firm is imposed. Due to the nature of the learning process all types of firm are 
more likely to survive as they age. In a special case of the learning models where firms 
enter with above average expectations on their efficiencies, the theory predicts survival 
likelihoods to initially decline with age before rising.
Survival-Size: The survival-5 /ze relationship for capitalist firms is predicted to be 
positive, since more efficient firms will be simulataneously larger and more likely to 
survive. For the French cooperative the relationship is indeterminate, since the 
theoretical learning models are unable to provide an unambiguous signing of the 
efficiency-size relationship.
Growth-Age: The growth rate of surviving capitalist firms is expected to decrease with 
age until the firm becomes very old, at which time the growth rate becomes independent 
of age. Growth rates are expected to be positive on average, since surviving firms are 
adjusting their efficiency and therefore their sizes upwards. For the French producer 
cooperative the theory is once again unable to provide any prediction on the growth-age 
relationship due to the indeterminacy of the efficiency-size relationship.
Growth-Size: The predicted relationship between growth and size for a given age group
is negative for the capitalist firm and growth rates are expected to be positive on average. 
This is due to the fact that the upper bound on efficiency induces an upper bound on firm 
size. In the case of the labour managed firm, however, the theoretical models once again 
fail to provide any precise predictions for growth-size relationship or on the average sign 
of the growth rate.
Table IV
Predicted Profit French
Relationships: Maximising Producer
Firm Coop
Efficiency - Size +
Efficiency - Age + +
Growth - Size* - 9
Growth - Age - 7
Survival - Size + 7
Survival - Age + +
Average Sign 
of Growth Rate
+ 7
4. The Empirical Model and Results
The empirical work to date has focused on two key issues which will also be considered 
here. The first is the issue of bias caused by sample selection in measuring firm survival 
and growth, since size is not always reported and we are only able to measure growth
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for surviving firms. In the case of survival, we will examine the differences in 
estimating survival probabilities using first the SA/SARL distinction as a proxy for size, 
and second using employment in conjunction with a sample selection equation measuring 
the relationship between not reporting and survival. For the growth estimation, we must 
determine whether firms who exit or do not report are on average faster or slower 
growing than those left behind.
The second issue is that of heteroscedasticity in the estimation of both the survival and 
the growth equations. Cross-sectional estimations involving size variables are particularly 
prone to heteroscedasticity problems, which tend to result in very low estimated standard 
errors and an exaggeration of the significance of the estimated coefficients. The 
equations in this chapter are estimated and results presented with corrections for 
heteroscedasticity.
4.1 Survival
We estimate firm survival using a probit model, where the underlying variable is a 
Jovanovic-type of firm efficiency variable, labelled x, which is unobserved. Although 
efficiency can not be observed, the theoretical models posit relationships between 
efficiency and size (See Table IV.) Furthermore, because less efficient firms tend to exit, 
the efficiency of surviving firms is predicted to be increasing in age. Efficiency may 
vary across industries due to differentials in technology, and across regions due to 
differentials in cost and infrastructure. Thus we estimate efficiency as a log-quadratic 
function of firm size and age, and descriptive variables such as creation type, industry 
and region, all contained in z. Efficiency is expected to be increasing in age, due to the
exit of less efficient firms in the cohort. The relationship between efficiency and size is 
more ambiguous; the theory suggests it depends on the ownership structure of the firm 
as can be seen from Table IV.
The firm survives (su r^ l)  if its efficiency variable, xi5 lies above the exit threshold, x0:
x , = p% + e, 
surt = 1 i f  x t-x0>0 
surt= 0  i f  x t-x0^0 
er m  1)
where x0 may be industry and/or region-specific.
To estimate equation (4.1) it was necessary to pick a proxy for size. The legal form 
distinction has the advantage of being available for all observations in the dataset, so it 
does not induce any sample selection bias; it has the disadvantage that it is a binary 
measure and it is not a clear cut proxy for size. Labour force is the best reported of the 
accounting variables, and has the advantage of being a clear and continuous size measure. 
However, it has the disadvantage that using it entails losing a substantial portion of the 
population in a nonrandom way. In particular, the lag of the labour force must be used 
since none of the failing firms have contemporaneous labour force data. Using the lag 
removes all one year old firms from the sample, plus older firms which did not report 
employment in the previous year, which in 1985 altogether eliminates about 12 percent 
of the population. In 1980, and after 1986 survival equations can not be estimated using 
employment for size since almost all of the failing firms are selected out of the sample.
Because both size options suffer from different drawbacks, equation (4.1) was estimated 
twice for all the cross-sections in the sample period, first using the legal form as a proxy 
for size, then using employment in conjunction with a sample selection equation.7 
Results for 1985 are given in Tables V (legal form) and VI (employment) while results 
for other years are listed in Appendices 1 (legal form) and 3 (employment).
Beginning with the legal form estimation in Table V, the likelihood of survival is found 
to have a convex relationship with firm age, with the minimum occurring at about age 
four.8 The relation becomes concave after about age ten. The inclusion of the SA 
dummies and the heteroscedasticity correction in the middle column of Table V are found 
to be significant, with the predicted values depicted in Figure 5.9 SA firms are found
Estimated Survival Probabilities: 19B5
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1 -10 2B 37 53 7 3 10032
Firm Age
le f ty - c o r r e c te d  e e t l e e t e e .
Figure 5
7A11 estimations in this paper were done in LIMDEP/386 Version 6.0.
8Ben Ner (1988) estimates hazard functions for UK worker-owned and conventional 
firms and finds they both peak at age three. His results are shown in the appendix to 
Chapter III.
9De Novo construction firm in Paris represents the intercept in all estimated 
equations.
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Table V
FROBIT MODEL OF FIRM SURVIVAL: SUR=1 if Survives; 0 if
Fails
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic
Heteroscedasticity-Corrected
Basic -----------------------------------
Probit v/ SA dummies w/o SA dummies
Constant 2.2677 2.6438 2.3216
0.2132 0.3089 0.2073
10.638 8.560 11.200
SA -0.7562 -0.7785
0.3222 0.4156
2.347 1.873
Log(Age) -0.1460 -0.1913 -0.1138
0.0317 0.5136 0.0291
4.605 3.724 3.910
Log(Age)*SA 0.1073 0.1128
0.0393 0.0623
2.729 1.809
(Log(Age))2 0.0048 0.0103 0.0057
0.0012 0.0032 0.0021
4.077 3.219 2.657
(Log (Age))2* -0.0037 -0.0046
SA 0.0013 0.0024
2.878 1.935
Heteroscedasticity Correction
Log(Age) 0.0381 0.0335
0.0127 0.0105
3.006 3.197
Log-L -452.127 -448.471 -452.373
Log-L (0) -479.957 -479.957 -479.957
Model Chi2 55.66* 62.97* 55.17*
% Correct 91.6% 91.6% 91.6%
Creation, industry, and region dummies omitted from
table.
Log-likelihood ratio tests: Chi2 D • O • F •
1) Inclusion of heteroscedasticity
correction 7.312* 1
2) Inclusion of SA dummies 7.805** 3
Significant at 1 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent.
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to be less likely to survive than SARL firms, particularly beyond about age four. This 
finding holds for four of the ten years estimated (see Appendix 1.)
Comparing this to the actual mean rates of survival across legal form for 1985 in Figure 
6, the pattern is similar, but not quite as sharp. Except for the middle period from ages 
10-34, firms of type S.A. have failed more often than S.A.R.L. firms, although Figure 
6 does not control for industry and region in order to maintain enough observations.
Actual Survival Rates by Legal Form: 1985
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Figure 6
If the legal form S. A. is truly proxying for larger sizes, then these results suggest a weak 
inverse relation between size and survival, at least for very young and very old firms. 
However, we know the SA class also includes a number of small firms who at birth 
expected to eventually become large. These smaller SA firms may discover after an 
initial period that their high expectations were unjustified, and close down. If so, this 
would create the false impression that large (as proxied by SA) firms are more vulnerable 
to failure. The only way to determine which explanation is correct is to compare the 
results with the estimation using employment for size.
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Before this could be done, it was necessary to test whether bias was being introduced into 
the equation by the nonreporting of lagged employment by some firms. Specifically, we 
wanted to test whether those firms which failed to report employment the year before 
were as a group more or less likely to survive this year than those remaining in the 
sample. The likelihood of sample inclusion was estimated for the entire population as 
a probit model with reporting a function of firm age, legal form, creation form, and 
industry. Firm age was included to capture nonreporting by younger firms and firms 
about to fail. Legal form was included since CG-SCOP may prefer to devote its limited 
resources to collection of data for the S.A. firms which it perceives as larger and 
economically more important. Creation form and industry were included to capture 
group effects. Results from the selection equation for all years are reported in Appendix 
2  at the end of this chapter.
The likelihood of sample inclusion is found to be increasing in age, but at a decreasing 
rate. This in part reflects the fact that there is a considerable amount of missing data for 
firms in their first few years. Sample inclusion likelihoods are found to be lower for 
young SA firms, but higher for old SA firms. This may be due to the overseeing 
organisation having limited resources which it prefers to target at data collection from the 
more established SA firms. Firms created as mutations from capitalist firms or 
reanimations of defunct cooperatives are also more likely to report than firms created de 
novo. This may be due to the former two groups receiving more startup aid from CG- 
SCOP, and therefore feeling more obliged to provide data. The equation fit is very good 
with 96 percent of observations correctly predicted in 1985 and a model chi-square of 892 
with 7 degrees freedom.
-122-
Table VI
FROBIT MODEL OF FIRM SURVIVAL: Year=1985, N=1358
Dependent variable SUR=1 if survives, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic
Sample Hetero- 
Basic Selection scedasticity
Model Model Correction
Constant 1.0622 0.9565 1.0359
0.1535 0.2998 0.1782
6.919 3.191 5.812
Log (Employ^) 0.1590 0.1601 0.2101
0.0566 0.0567 0.1008
2.811 2.824 2.084
(Log (Employ,.,))2 N/S N/S N/S
Log (Age,.,) -0.2816 -0.1896 -0.2527
0.1351 0.2612 0.1907
2.084 0.726 1.325
(LogtAge^,) )2* 0.0850 0.0663 0.1459
0.0331 0.0562 0.1700
Lambda
2.565 1.179
0.2636
0.6446
0.409
0.858
Heteroscedasticity Correction
Log(Agetl) 0.1528
0.2468
0.619
Log-L (L) -391.5 -391.4 -389.9
Log-L zero- 
slopes (Lq)
-403.3 -403.3 -403.3
Model Chi2 24.69* 23.86* 26.97*
% Correct 91.3% 91.2% 91.2%
Creation, industry and region dummies omitted from 
table.
Log-likelihood ratio tests: Chi-squared D.o.F.
1) Inclusion of sample selection
correction: 0.200 1
2) Inclusion of heteroscedasticity
correction: 3.200 1
*Siqnificant at 1 percent. "significant at 5 percent.
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Equation (4.1) was reestimated using employment for size and an inverse Mills ratio, 
denoted lambda, to measure sample selection bias. The results for this estimation are 
listed in Table VI. In 1985, sample selection bias was found to be insignificant, as 
evidenced by the low t-statistic on lambda in column 2 of Table VI, and by the chi-square 
test on the inclusion of lambda, which is insignificant. In fact, the only year in which 
sample selection bias was found to be significant was 1984 (See Appendix 3), when a 
number of very large firms failed.
Next it was necessary to check for heteroscedasticity. Wherever Lagrange multiplier 
tests detected heteroscedasticity this was purged by modelling the disturbances as:
Var[e) = e y'y‘
(4.2)
where the y vector used here is simply the log of firm age. 10 This follows from the 
theoretical notion that firms learn as they age, so the amount of noise evident in 
observations on younger firms will be greater. The predicted probabilities then become:
P ,z-
Prob(suri = 1) = $ ( — -)
ey'yt (4.3)
In 1985, the heteroscedasticity correction is not significant, but in three of the six years 
estimated it is, with the residuals showing a strong age trend. Depending on the year, 
the estimated coefficient is of the order of .3 to .5, suggesting an increasing, slightly 
concave relation of the variance with age. At first glance this is somewhat surprising,
10See Godfrey (1978), Greene (1990) p. 685. With y=ln(age), this simplifies to
Var[et] = Age"1’
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since theory would suggest that the variance would be decreasing in age as the amount 
of noise in the learning process diminishes. However, the equation is weighted by the 
inverse of this function, and the inverse is declining in age. Thus, effectively the errors 
are scaled down most for the lowest ages, which is consistent with the theoretical learning 
model.
The predicted survival-age relationship is unchanged from before. The basic pattern that 
emerges is an initially high survival probability that declines rapidly in the early years 
until somewhere between ages 2 and 6 , depending on the year. After bottoming out, the 
survival likelihood then rises monotonically with age. This is consistent with a version 
of the theoretical model in which entrants enter with "optimistic” expectations about their 
efficiencies. It takes a few years for the inefficient firms to lower their expectations by 
enough to make exit a genuine likelihood. Once this stage is reached, survival 
likelihoods are increasing in age thereafter.
The predicted survival-size relationship is significantly positive in all years when 
employment is used to proxy for size (See Figure 7). This suggests that the Table V 
results reflect a large number of the smaller SA firms failing in 1985, rather than a 
negative relationship between survival and size. The positive survival-size relationship 
is similar to past findings for conventional capitalist firms, and inconsistent with a 
negative efficiency-size relationship. Thus the survival-age and survival-size results for 
these firms are exactly identical to past results for conventional firms.
Estimated Survival Probabilities: 1985
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By estimating the data in cross sections, we were able to identify changes in the estimated 
survival-size and survival-age relationships over the French business cycle. For the 
survival-age relationship, we use the estimations using the legal form classification since 
it allows us to observe more years. We find the business cycle appears to have an impact 
on the curvature of the survival-age relationship. In downswing years this curvature 
becomes more pronounced, with the gap in survival likelihoods for young and older firms 
increasing, while in recovery years the relationship tends to flatten out. Between 1980 
and 1987, France’s unemployment rate rose continuously from 6.3 percent to 10.5 
percent, falling thereafter. Between 1980 and 1987, annual real GDP growth ranged 
from 0.8 percent to 2.4 percent, with the trough occurring in 1983. Only in 1988 did 
the economy spring back into strong growth at a (real) rate of 3.6 percent with 
unemployment falling to 9.4 percent.
The business cycle effect on the likelihood of firm survival appears to lag real GDP
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Estimated Survival Probabilities
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growth by about a year, but is closely related to the rate of change of the unemployment 
rate. The impact of the business cycle is clearly reflected in Figure 8, which plots on 
the left axis the survival likelihood of several age groups over the sample period, and on 
the right axis the rate of change of France’s employment rate (one minus the 
unemployment rate). For the younger ages, the predicted probabilities track changes in 
macroeconomic employment conditions while the linkage is weaker for the older age 
groups. Simply put, in most years younger firms (except for "new-boms") are more 
vulnerable to failure than older firms, and in bad years the vulnerability of younger firms 
to failure rises by more than for older firms.
The survival-size relationship also shows a business cycle effect, although we can only 
observe this for 1981-1986 since we were unable to estimate survival using lagged 
employment in the other years. The predicted relationship over the business cycle is
pictured in Figure 9, which plots on the left hand axis the estimated survival probabilities
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for six size groups, and on the right hand axis the rate of change of the employment rate 
(one minus the unemployment rate). Business cycle downswings appear principally to 
have adverse effects on both very large firms and very small firms, but less so for 
medium sized firms.
The size ranking of the survival probabilities is less consistent than the age ranking over 
the years, and in particular in 1984 when a number of very large firms fail, the largest 
firms are predicted to have the poorest survival odds, followed by the very small firms. 
This year coincides with the sharpest contraction in the employment rate in the sample 
period. The other year where employment contracts very sharply is 1981, where again, 
the very small and very large firms are predicted more likely to fail than the medium 
sized firms.
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Thus it appears that the business cycle does not affect small firms in the same way it 
affects young firms. In fact this is intuitive since young firms, whether large or small, 
are not yet well established in their markets, and are therefore more vulnerable to shocks. 
This "liability of newness” is well documented in the life-cycle literature (Freemont et 
al., 1983, Ben Ner, 1988). Not so for small firms, especially older small firms, who 
may be small simply because they have found this to be their optimal scale of operations, 
and can be well-established enough to be able to survive most exogenous shocks.
To summarise the results on firm survival, we find a positive relationship between 
survival and both size and age for French producer cooperatives, except for very young 
ages. This is precisely the same as past findings for both conventional and labour 
managed firms and is inconsistent with a negative efficiency-size relationship. We also 
find that downswings in the business cycle appear to affect the survival odds of young 
firms far more than older firms, causing the differentials in survival likelihoods between 
young and old firms to increase greatly. Finally, business cycle downswings are found 
to adversely impact very small and very large firms by more than medium-sized firms.
4.2 Growth
Having determined the relationship of survival probability with size and age, we would 
like to proceed to testing the theoretical predictions for firm growth. But before 
examining the pattern of firm growth, we must first address the sample selection bias 
induced by exit and non-reporting. Since we measure growth based on sales, we are 
principally interested in whether the firm survives and reports sales in two consecutive 
years.
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To control for sample selection bias due to exit and non-reporting of two consecutive 
years of sales data, we create the variable:
repsur = 1 i f  firm survives and reports a growth rate 
= 0  otherwise
This variable can be interpreted as the joint probability a firm survives and reports a 
growth rate. We use the same functional form we used for the sample selection equation 
estimated in conjunction with equation (4.1). To this we added two dummies 
representing firms who fail one year hence and firms who fail two years hence. Where 
significant, creation type, industry and regional dummies were also included. We denote 
the vector of explanatory variables as v. The equation becomes:
Pirepsur^l) = a'vi + ui 
u~N(0,l)
(4.4)
Results for 1985 are reported in Table VII. In column 1 is a basic probit estimation of 
(4.4), and in columns 2 and 3, estimates derived from the joint estimation of (4.4) with 
the growth equation. Column 3 includes heteroscedasticity-corrected estimates, the 
technique for which is described in the next section. Results for other years are reported 
in Appendix 5. The likelihood of selection is found to have a concave relationship with 
age. The legal form has little impact on the selection probability for young firms, but 
older SARL firms are much less likely to be selected into the sample than older SA 
firms. Finally all firms are much less likely to be included into the sample if they are 
about to fail, because prior to failure very few firms bother to report.
Table VII
Dependent Variable REPSUR=1 if Survives and Reports
0 otherwise 
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic 
Year=1985, MLE Estimates
Sample Selection Model
Basic Heteroscedasticity
Probit Uncorrected Corrected
MLE MLE MLE
One -1.2246
0.1318
9.289
-1.2247
0.1384
8.846
-1.2316
0.1835
6.713
SA 0.44289
0.1979
2.238
0.44329
0.198
2.239
0.60355
0.2233
2.702
Log (Age,.,) 0.9476
0.1454
6.517
0.9476
0.1525
6.212
1.0466
0.1916
5.462
Log(Aget_!) *SA -0.6141
0.2168
2.833
-0.6141
0.2195
2.798
-0.7953
0.2463
3.229
(Log (Age^) )2 -0.1873
0.0386
4.854
-0.1873
0.0395
4.739
-0.2138
0.0487
4.390
(Log(Age^))2 *SA 0.1868
0.0513
3.641
0.1868
0.0518
3.609
0.2275
0.0580
3.923
FAIL IN 1 YR -1.422
0.1545
9.204
-1.422
0.1532
9.281
-1.4406
0.1875
7.683
FAIL IN 2 YRS -0.3277
0.1585
2.068
-0.3280
0.1523
2.154
-0.2204
0.1352
1.629
Log-Likelihood* 
Model Degrees Used* 
N
% Correct
776.516
10
1420
70.8%
-815.776
20
1420
70.8%
-661.865
20
1420
70.6%
‘Statistics for Columns 2 and 3 include growth equation. 
Creation type, industry, and regional dummies omitted 
from table.
Figure 10 plots the estimated selection probability for 1985 for SA and SARL firms. In 
the early ages, the likelihood of selection is very poor for all firms, due to high failure 
rates and poor reporting among survivors. However, after about age 10, the relative 
selection patterns between the two legal form categories diverge. SA firms continue to 
become increasingly likely to be selected into the sample. SARL firms, however, have 
their selection likelihood peak at age 10, and from there onwards, become increasingly 
less likely to be selected into the sample.
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We know from Figure 5 that after the first 5 years, both types of firm are more likely 
to survive as they age. So there must be some factor coming into play with SARL firms 
which causes older ones not to report as frequently as younger ones. Perhaps SARL 
firms, as they age, learn that the costs of not reporting are fairly small, and the 
overseeing organisation prefers to devote its limited resources to maximising data 
collection on the old and established SA firms who employ the most workers. In terms 
of the econometrics, for young ages there is relatively little distortion in the data, but for
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older ages, the selected sample will include far more SA than SARL firms relative to the 
population. To the extent that the upper bound on SARL membership constrains the 
growth of these firms, we will be eliminating slower growing firms. In terms of age 
distortion, the sample will include far more older firms of type SA, but more middle-aged 
SARL firms relative to the population at large.
We are now able to proceed to a selectivity model of firm growth. We estimate the 
expectation of the firm’s growth rate, contingent on the firm surviving and reporting. 
This is given by the following system of equations:
Efejlve/wur^l]
= \xp a 'v t + «(X>]
= P'x, + £[e(|«,>-o'v(]
(KaV.)
= P V ( p o a )  —
®(«Vp
= P'*, + (p o .)* , (4 5)
where at is the standard error of the uncorrected growth equation and p is the correlation 
between the errors of the uncorrected growth and the selection probit equation. The 
vector Xj includes a set of explanatory variables for growth, including second order log 
expansions of age and size lagged, and dummies for industries and regions. In the 
Heckman estimation, since it is not possible to estimate at and p separately, ae is 
normalised to equal one. The coefficient reported for X represents the product of at and 
p. In the maximum likelihood estimation, these parameters are estimated and reported 
separately. The results for the Heckman and MLE estimations are reported in columns 
two and three of Table VIII.
Table VIII
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FIRM GROWTH= Log(Salest) -Log(Salest.j) 
Coefficient, standard Error, t-statistic
YEAR=1985 
--------- Sample Selection Models-
Basic
O ls
Uncorrected
Heckman MLE
Heteroscedasticity 
Corrected 
Heckman MLE
One 1.5902
0.2727
5.8320
1.6148
0.3051
5.2920
1.6147
0.2333
6.9200
1.3495
0.2886
4.6760
1.3222
0.2218
5.9600
Log (Age,.!) -0.4611
0.0612
7.529
-0.4643
0.0635
7.312
-0.4643
0.0556
8.345
-0.3740
0.0579
6.456
-0.3699
0.0513
7.207
(Log (Age,.,))2 0.0420
0.0078
5.357
0.0425
0.0083
5.123
0.0425
0.0095
4.471
0.0404
0.0071
5.665
0.0400
0.0076
5.274
Log(Salest.1) -0.1947
0.0683
2.852
-0.1968
0.0688
2.860
-0.1968
0.0514
3.830
-0.1531
0.0637
2.402
-0.1511
0.0481
3.141
(Log(Salest.1) )2 0.0055
0.0045
1.212
0.0056
0.0045
1.233
0.0056
0.0034
1.619
0.0041
0.0040
1.013
0.0040
0.0032
1.241
LogCSales^)* 
Log (Aget_!)
0.0239
0.0073
3.273
0.0237
0.0073
3.26
0.0237
0.0060
3.975
0.0144
0.0058
2.469
0.0144
0.0053
2.694
Membership^/ 
Labour Forces
-0.0819
0.0514
1.595
-0.0826
0.0511
1.615
-0.0827
0.0573
1.443
-0.0945
0.0466
2.026
-0.0936
0.0498
1.879
Lambda -0.0102
0.0585
0.174
-0.0109
0.0586
0.185
Sigma 0.2600
0.0049
52.689
0.2325
0.0045
51.733
Rho -0.3765
0.1947
0.1930
0.0063
0.2028
0.0310
Adj. R-square 0.2616 
F 28.737
Log-Likelihood 
k 7
N 549
0.2603 0.2590
25.104
-815.776 
8 18
549 1420
0.2178 0.2529
20.068
-661.865 
8 18
549 1420
Creation type, industry and regional dummies omitted from 
t a b l e -
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A Lagrange multiplier test found the errors from these equations to be heteroscedastic. 
Heteroscedasticity was purged by using a weighting variable in the estimations reported 
in columns four and five of Table VIII. However, it was necessary to construct a 
weighting scheme which would correct heteroscedasticity not only in the growth equation, 
but also in the sample selection probit which is estimated jointly. To this end, the 
weights were derived as follows: The residuals from the estimation in column 3 of Table 
VIII existed only for those observations selected into the sample. These were squared 
and regressed against the variables from the selection probit model in Table VII.11 
(Results of this estimation are reported in Appendix 4.) The coefficients from the 
resulting estimation were used to generate "fitted” values of the squared errors for the 
observations selected out of the sample.12 Weights were then derived for the entire 
population by taking the inverse of the square root of these fitted values. These weights 
were applied to the log-likelihood function and the derivatives in the iterations towards 
MLE convergence.
The predicted maximum likelihood relationship between firm growth and age is listed in 
Table VIII and plotted in Figure 11. All the age variables are found to be significant at 
1 percent, with the coefficient on age negative and on age-squared positive implying a 
convex relationship between growth and age. The coefficient on the product of age and 
size is also positive, indicating that growth is expected to rise in age given size and vice 
versa. In all the years estimated, the coefficient on age is positive, and significant in all
nThe reasoning behind using the variables from Table VII is that these contain no 
missing values so the regression could then be used to generate weights for observations 
selected out of the sample as well as those selected in.
12The author would like to thank Hugh Wills for recommending this approach.
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but one. Age-squared is significantly positive in 5 of the 8 years estimated while the 
product of size and age is significantly positive in 7 of the 8 years.
MLE Predicted Growth-Age Relationship 
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Figure 11 shows growth to be at its highest following creation, declining sharply in the 
first years and continuing to decline until about age 20. Thereafter, growth rises very 
gradually to approach zero for the older ages. The convex relationship between growth 
and age is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical models and similar to past 
findings for conventional firms. It is interesting that for a substantial range of firm ages 
in the case illustrated, growth becomes negative after an initial period and then eventually 
rises to approach zero. This is inconsistent with a model in which firm size is positively 
related to efficiency, as it is with conventional firms.13 It may also simply reflect the 
choice of the quadratic functional form on age and the particular intercept dummies 
illustrated. The initial positive growth period is consistent with excessive noise in the
13It is also of course not inconsistent with the indeterminate predictions of the 
membership model of the French producer cooperative.
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early years distorting the firm’s evaluation of its own efficiency, and also with new firms 
entering at a very small scale due to capital and other constraints. However, Figure 12 
plots the actual growth-age relationship for all firms, and does not lend strong support 
to the negative growth rate prediction of Figure 11, suggesting that this result is probably 
driven by a few outliers and not too much weight should be attached to this finding.
Actual Growth-Age Relationship
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The predicted relationship between growth and size-lagged is similar to the growth-age 
relationship, and also with previous growth-size findings for capitalist firms. The 
coefficient on size is negative and significant, on size-squared it is positive but 
insignificant.14 (However, in all the other years estimated (See Appendix 6) it is 
significantly positive.) Once again growth is highest at the smallest size levels, falling 
rapidly as firm sales increase until about 2 billion (1980) FF after which the decline
14However, in all the other years estimated (See Appendix 4) it is significantly 
positive.
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slows. The predicted relationship is depicted in Figure 13.
MLE Predicted Growth-Size Relationship 
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We find growth to be greatest (and positive) for small LMFs, falling to near zero for 
large LMFs. The rate of growth is shown to decline with size at a decreasing rate. This 
is consistent with a positive efficiency-size relationship, and with the theoretical notion 
of an upper bound to firm efficiency, and through efficiency to optimal size (See Dunne, 
Roberts and Samuelson (1989), and Chapter II.) The actual growth-size relationship for 
1985 is illustrated in Figure 14.
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The relationship between growth and the membership-ratio is found to be negative, but 
only weakly significant.15 In the French producer cooperative model, the membership 
ratio is correlated with the capital-labour ratio. While too much should not be read into 
this weakly significant finding, the suggestion is that the more capital intensive the firm 
is, the less likely it is to grow. This can be explained by the role of members in 
providing collateral for financing capital expansion, whether the members borrow funds 
individually under internal financing, or the firm borrows funds collectively under 
external financing. As long as the members provide collateral for loans, then all else 
equal, the lower the level of membership (or the higher the level of capital already being 
financed) the harder it will be for the firm to obtain new loans.
Finally, the sample selection correction is found to be insignificant in all the years 
estimated. None of the coefficients in column 5 of Table VIII are statistically different 
from column 1 of the same table. This finding is somewhat surprising given the strong 
age and size effects found in the sample selection results in Table VII. However, the 
selection bias appears to only enter for older firms, and if old SA and SARL firms both 
tend to have growth rates approaching zero, the selection bias will have little impact on 
the results.
Equation (4.5) was estimated in cross-sections for all the years 1980-1987,16 and once
15It is significant at 10 percent but not at 5 percent. In other years it is consistently 
negative but only significant at 5 percent in 3 of the 8 years estimated.
16The years 1988 and 1989 were omitted since the estimation requires a dummy 
variable for firms which fail one and two years hence, and this information was not 
available in the final two years of the sample.
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again a cyclical pattern emerged in the estimations. As France’s economy slowed down 
over this period, the gap between the predicted growth rates of young and old firms 
narrowed. Figure 15 illustrates growth rates for six age groups (on the left axis) over 
these years together with France’s unemployment rate (on the right axis). The growth
The Business Cycle and Growth-Age Relationship
De Novo C on stru ction  Firm in P a r is: Sample Mean
12
□ B
O .S
0.2
■■Ige--20---*gtr-99 Uvlt:--
Age 1 Age 3 Age S Age 10
Year
M v U ro * c « » ttic f ty --c o rr« c t» d  w h m i m .
Figure 15
ranking of the age groups remains uniform over the period, but there is a clear 
convergence among the growth rates in the latter part of the sample period as the 
unemployment rate became very high. This suggests that in good times younger firms 
grow much faster than older firms, but in downswing years, all firms grow slowly and 
at about the same rate.
A similar business cycle effect is evident in the growth-size relationship depicted in 
Figure 16. In this period of rising unemployment, the gap between growth rates for 
small and large firms is initially high, declining over time and converging close to zero. 
The ranking of the size categories remains constant throughout.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter tested some of the theoretical hypotheses derived in Chapters II and III, 
where learning models of firm growth and survival were applied to the special case of 
the labour managed firm. In spite of the strong impact of the form of ownership 
assumptions on the theoretical predictions seen in Chapters II and III, the empirical 
results from this chapter indicate that French producer cooperatives survive and grow in 
much the same way as American capitalist firms. The different internal organisational 
structure appears to have no empirical impact on the growth and survival relationships 
of this firms over their life cycles and relative to their sizes.
As expected, survival was found to be positively related to age for cooperative firms in 
any given size category. Survival was found to be positively related to size (given age) 
for small sizes. These results are robust after having controlled for sample selection bias 
and heteroscedasticity.
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Firm growth was also analyzed, taking into account potential bias caused by sample 
selection. Sample selection was found not to have induced any bias, since the bias only 
appears for the class of old firms where SA and SARL firms grow in much the same 
way. Growth was found to be inversely related to size and age, even after controlling 
for heteroscedasticity.
The business cycle plays an important role in the growth and survival of all firms, 
including labour managed firms. This chapter finds that downswings in the business 
cycle appear to have the greatest adverse impact on the survival of young firms on the 
one hand and very small and very large firms on the other hand. For surviving firms, 
business cycle downswings appear to reduce growth most for younger and smaller firms.
The findings on the relationship between firm growth, size and age exactly parallel 
previous empirical findings for conventional firms (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 
(1989), Evans (1987a, 1987b), Hall (1987)), and labour managed firms (Ben Ner, 1988). 
Yet if these empirical relationships hold so broadly and pervasively, why are the 
theoretical learning models only able to give vague or empirically incorrect predictions?
This leads us to suggest that perhaps the lack of success of the learning models in 
decisively explaining the growth and survival behaviour of labour managed firms is due 
to the fact that they attach too much significance to the firm’s ownership structure, and 
attach too narrow an interpretation on the nature of efficiency gains through learning.
It is clear from the empirical results that some form of learning and adjustment is going
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on in these firms over time, as evidenced by the strong age relationships uncovered. 
Additionally, this learning process follows the same pattern for labour managed firms as 
it has been shown to follow for conventional profit maximising firms. The notion of 
learning by firms thus appears a valid modelling element to maintain, but the current 
structure that leads to efficiency-size relationships that vary with organisational form will 
need to be modified. This and other directions of possible future research are discussed 
further in Chapter V.
Appendix 1
PROBIT MODEL OF FIRM SURVIVAL: SUR=1 if survives,
0 otherwise 
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Constant 2.5126 2.4606 1.7944 2.3673 2.8259 2.6438
0.2736 0.2443 0.1490 0.2080 0.3009 0.3089
9.184 10.074 12.044 11.382 9.392 8.560
SA N/S N/S 0.7636 N/S N/S -0.7785
0.1763 0.4156
4.330 1.873
Log(Age) -0.5106 -1.1030-1.2210-1.9905-3.0198-1.9129 
0.2516 0.342 0.192 0.4677 0.5508 0.5136 
2.029 3.225 6.361 4.256 5.483 3.724
Log(Age)*SA N/S N/S N/S 0.6032
0.2101
2.871
N/S 1.1276 
0.6232 
1.809
(Log(Age)) 0.2771 0.5489 0.3419 1.2746 1.5209 1.0309
0.1377 0.2630 0.0608 0.3651 0.3110 0.3203
2.013 2.087 5.622 3.491 4.891 3.219
(Log(Age)2) -0.1986
*SA 0.1213
1.637
N/S -0.0937 
0.0362 
2.592
N/S N/S -0.4581 
0.2368
1.935
Heteroscedasticity Correction
Log(Age) N/S 0.342 N/S 0.5807 0.5430 0.3814
0.1369 0.0766 0.0625 0.1269
2.499 7.577 8.685 3.006
Log-L -126.4 -248.9 -318.0 -402.5 -589.1 -448.4
Model Chi2 30.4* 37.7* 80.3* 90.4* 146.6* 63.0*
N 905 1128 1373 1536 1648 1658
k 4 6 9 7 8 9
% Correct 96.4% 93.6% 92.7% 91.5% 86.2% 91.6%
Industry, region and creation dummies omitted from 
table.
‘Significant at 1 percent.
-144-
Appendix 1 (Cont.)
PROBIT MODEL OF FIRM SURVIVAL: SUR=1 if survives, 0
otherwise
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic
1986 1987 1988 1989
Constant 2.7393
0.3087
8.872
2.9548
0.6337
4.663
1.8604
0.2185
8.514
2.1081
0.3553
5.933
SA N/S N/S N/S 2.4401
1.2200
2.000
Log(Age) -2.8667
0.5702
5.027
-2.5455
0.9721
2.619
-0.9408
0.2412
3.900
-2.036
0.6661
3.057
Log(Age)*SA 0.3988
0.1651
2.416
N/S 0.6326
0.1705
3.710
-0.723
0.5975
1.211
(Log(Age))2 1.4495
0.3228
4.491
1.7449
0.5547
3.146
0.241
0.0687
3.506
1.0604
0.391
2.712
(Log(Age)2)*SA N/S N/S -0.1850
0.0639
2.898
N/S
Heteroscedasticity Correction
Log(Age) 0.5847 0.5934
0.0643 0.0824 
9.088 7.198
N/S 0.4166
0.1082
3.850
Log-Likelihood 
Model Chi2 
N 
k
% Correct
-645.8
115.6*
1661
8
85.1%
-417.0
84.0*
1507
9
90.9%
-398.0
70.8*
1482
11
91.4%
-374.3
139.8
1448
14
90.9%
Industry, region and creation dummies omitted from 
table.
‘significant at 1 percent.
Appendix 2
Sample Selection Model 
Dependent Variable: NMISS=l if firm reports lagged 
employment, 0 otherwise
1985
Constant -1.4076
0.1181
11.914
Log(Age) 3.3251
0.1742
19.089
Log(Age)*SA -0.7053
0.1827
3.861
(Log(Age))
(Log (Age) )2*SA
-0.6831
0.0454
15.051
0.2466
0.0584
4.556
Mutation 0.5799
0.2195
2.642
Reanimation 0.5771
0.1388
4.158
Log-Likelihood
Log-Likelihood 
(Zero Slopes)
Chi Squared 
Percent Correct
-333.12
-779.38
892.53
96.0%
Industry and region dummies omitted from table, 
"significant at 1 percent.
Appendix 3
PROBIT MODEL OF FIRM SURVIVAL: SUR=1 if survives, 0
otherwise
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Constant 0.8659 1.0263 
0.2852 0.1303 
3.036 7.875
0.2745
0.218
1.259
-0.8130
0.3555
2.287
1.0622
0.1535
6.919
0.1549
0.4024
0.385
Log(Aget-l) -0.3686 -0.4221 
0.1736 0.1482 
2.123 2.849
N/S N/S -■0.2816
0.1351
2.084
-0.8954
0.3185
2.812
Log(Aget-l)2 0.1011 0.1141 
0.0410 0.0372 
2.467 3.066
0.3657
0.2268
1.611
0.3476
0.1403
2.478
0.0850
0.0331
2.565
0.7613
0.2698
2.821
Log(Employ­
ment^ )
0.4695 N/S
0.1995
2.353
0.3638
0.0901
4.037
1.0468
0.2385
4.389
0.1590
0.0566
2.811
0.7374
0.3534
2.087
Log(Employ-
ment^)2
-0.0621 0.0457 
0.0310 0.0128 
2.004 3.583
N/S -0.1677
0.0418
4.015
N/S -0.0847
0.0669
1.266
Lambda N/S N/S N/S 1.4462
0.4564
3.168
N/S N/S
Heteroscedasticity Correction:
Log(Aget_!) N/S N/S 0.3712
0.1359
2.731
0.3218
0.0940
3.423
N/S 0.4620 
0.0916 
5.044
Log-L (Zero 0) -234.0 -307.0 
Log-L -224.7 -285.2 
Model Chi2 18.60 43.54 
n 844 1023 
k 5 7 
% Correct 92.1% 91.1%
-401.8
-356.3
91.15
1228
9
89.9%
-602.85
-555.27
95.15
1356
8
83.5%
-403.3
-391.5
23.69
1358
5
91.2%
-641.3
606.7
69.12
1462
7
84.1%
Industry, region and creation form dummies omitted from 
table.
Appendix 4
OLS Regression 
Dependent Variable = Selection Equation Residuals
Squared 
Year=1985, N=549
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic
Constant 0.1973 0.0417 4.730
SA -0.1058 0.0567 1.866
Log(Age,.[) -0.0969 0.0425 2.280
LogCAgej.!) *SA 0.1305 0.0570 2.289
(LogCAge^,) )2 0.2167 0.1014 2.137
(Log(Age,.,) )2*SA -0.3090 0.1258 2.457
Mutation -0.0556 0.0262 2.119
Fail in 1 Year 0.0396 0.0594 0.667
Fail in 2 Years -0.0415 0.0436 0.952
Western Region 0.0491 0.0256 1.921
Manuf actur ing -0.0536 0.0215 2.488
Adj. R-Squared 0.0252
F(10,538) 2.4177
Durbin Watson 1.9749
Sum of Squares 22.0988
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Appendix 5
Sample Selection Model: 
Heteroscedasticity-Corrected MLE 
Dependent Variable:
REPSUR=l if survives and reports, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient, Standard Error, t-statistic
1980 1981 1982 1983
One 0.1430
0.1792
0.798
-0.2646
0.2162
1.224
-0.1017
0.1284
0.792
-0.1230
0.1261
0.975
SA N/S 0.7137
0.3343
2.135
0.8851
0.1820
4.865
0.4145
0.0963
4.304
Log (Age,.,) 0.2209
0.0495
4.460
0.6087
0.2614
2.329
0.3823
0.0573
6.677
0.4679
0.1180
3.965
Log(Aget.,) *SA N/S -0.7051
0.3694
1.909
-0.2802
0.0713
3.932
N/S
(Log(AgeM ))2 N/S -0.1008
0.0703
1.434
N/S -0.0535
0.0296
1.808
(Log (Aget_!))2* SA N/S 0.1770
0.0885
2.000
N/S N/S
Fail in 1 Year -2.0585
0.3169
6.495
-1.9023
0.2703
7.038
-1.4533
0.1737
8.368
-1.6107
0.1759
9.158
Fail in 2 Years -0.4127
0.3015
1.369
N/S N/S N/S
Log-Likelihood*
Chi-squared
(N,k)
% correct
■327.997 -503.465 
188.1* 206.2* 
(749,6) (860,10) 
81.3% 78.1%
-747.146
259.8*
(1055,7)
77.3%
-765.190
381.6*
(1271,5)
75.5%
**Log-likelihood statistic includes growth equation. 
'Significant at 1 percent.
Appendix 5 (Cont.)
Sample Selection Model: 
Heteroscedasticity-Corrected MLE 
Dependent Variable:
REPSUR=1 if survives and reports, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient, standard Error, t-statistic
1984 1985 1986 1987
One -0.8619
0.1565
5.509
-1.2316
0.1800
6.713
-1.1326
0.1573
7.202
-1.0610
0.1395
7.607
SA N/S 0.6036
0.2233
2.702
0.7892
0.2425
3.254
N/S
Log(Aget.,) 0.4346
0.1331
3.266
1.0466
0.1916
5.462
1.2186
0.1647
7.398
1.2354
0.1384
8.924
Log(Aget.1) *SA N/S -0.7953
0.2463
3.229
-0.5775
0.2533
2.280
-0.2296
0.0329
6.988
(Log(AgeM ))2 -0.0768
0.0346
2.219
-0.2138
0.0487
4.390
-0.2353
0.0422
5.574
N/S
(Log (Age^,)) 2*SA 0.0705
0.0180
3.907
0.2275
0.0580
3.923
0.1469
0.0581
2.524
0.0578
0.0132
4.378
Fail in 1 Year -1.3032
0.2697
4.832
-1.4406
0.1875
7.683
-1.9137
0.1901
10.066
N/S
Fail in 2 Years N/S -0.2204
0.1352
1.629
N/S N/S
Log-Likelihood** -813.568 -661.865 -839.267 -638.123
Chi-squared 251.5* 341.9* 464.2* 346.2*
(N,k) (1405,6)(1420,10)(1517,10) (1410,8)
% correct 68.0% 81.3% 74.0% 73.8%
**Log-likelihood statistic includes growth equation. 
’Significant at 1 percent.
Appendix 6
Dependent Variable:
Firm growth=log(Salest) -log(SalesM ) 
Sample Selection Model: 
Heteroscedasticity-Corrected MLE
1980 1981 1982 1983
One 3.3423
0.1250
26.734
4.0580
0.1016
39.943
4.2912
0.1300
32.998
3.8793
0.1566
24.779
Log (Age,.,) -0.8457
0.0503
16.810
-0.4708
0.0585
8.048
-0.8779
0.0552
15.914
-0.5814
0.0561
10.359
(Log(Agen))2 0.0285
0.0088
3.250
0.0424
0.0111
3.832
0.0653
0.0105
6.236
0.0518
0.0090
5.764
LogCSales^) -0.4437
0.0292
15.190
-0.7896
0.0208
37.996
-0.6600
0.0315
20.975
-0.7176
0.0399
17.970
(LogCSales^))2 0.0067
0.0026
2.529
0.0408
0.0024
17.018
0.0252
0.0031
8.184
0.0350
0.0033
10.570
Log(Salest.1) * 
Log (Age^)
0.0802
0.0074
10.776
0.0246
0.0080
3.062
0.0559
0.0078
7.131
0.0307
0.0073
4.178
(Membership/ 
Labour Force) w
-0.0012
0.0562
0.021
-0.0613
0.0629
0.975
-0.1556
0.0576
2.701
-0.0448
0.0532
-0.841
Sigma 0.2915
0.0045
65.002
0.3224
0.0043
74.876
0.3747
0.0069
54.454
0.3362
0.0049
68.177
Rho -0.0966
0.2188
0.442
-0.1201
0.1770
0.679
-0.1871
0.1982
0.944
-0.1331
0.1433
0.929
Log-Likelihood -327.997 -503.470 -747.146 -765.190
k 14 18 15 13
N 749 860 737 1271
Adj. R-squared 0.5406 0.5353 0.5830 0.4919
Appendix 6 (Cont.)
Dependent Variable:
Firm growth=log(Salest) -log(Sales^) 
Sample Selection Model: 
Heteroscedasticity-Corrected MLE
1984 1985 1986 1987
One 3.5483
0.2206
16.087
1.3222
0.2218
5.960
2.0983
0.1600
13.111
1.3965
0.1841
7.588
Log(Age,.,) -0.5233
0.0696
7.518
-0.3699
0.0513
7.207
-0.2881
0.0659
4.375
-0.0911
0.0633
1.440
(Log(Agen))2 0.0178
0.0113
1.577
0.0400
0.0076
5.274
0.0143
0.0091
1.574
-0.0005
0.0101
0.048
LogfSaleSn) -0.6014
0.0478
12.575
-0.1511
0.0481
3.141
-0.3521
0.0389
9.057
-0.2542
0.0406
6.269
(LogCSaleSn))2 0.0262
0.0041
6.446
0.0040
0.0032
1.241
0.0153
0.0032
4.775
0.0117
0.0033
3.517
LogCSales^)* 
Log(Age^)
0.0427
0.0085
5.040
0.0144
0.0053
2.694
0.0217
0.0076
2.836
0.0095
0.0077
1.231
(Membership/ 
Labour Force)^
-0.2471
0.0604
4.094
-0.0936
0.0498
1.879
-0.0794
0.0468
1.698
-0.0872
0.0414
2.104
Sigma 0.3239
0.0108
29.902
0.2325
0.0045
51.733
0.2663
0.0030
89.017
0.2405
0.0035
68.761
Rho -0.1604
0.2483
0.646
0.0063
0.2028
0.031
-0.0078
0.1930
0.040
-0.0280
0.2388
0.117
Log-Likelihood -813.558 -661.865 -839.267 -638.123
k 14 18 18 16
N 1405 1420 1517 1410
Adj. R-squared 0.4921 0.2529 0.1799 0.0762
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CHAPTER V: Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
I would like to thank John Sutton, Saul Estrin and Paul Geroski for 
helpful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are my own.
1. Summary of Findings
This thesis examined the recent theoretical and empirical literature on the growth and 
survival of firms, and tested the robustness of past findings to alternative internal 
organisational structures. The analysis began with the most recent class of growth and 
survival models, the evolutionary learning models of Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and 
Pakes (1989), which were developed for profit maximising firms. These models provide 
sharp predictions on the relationship between growth, survival, size and age: the 
likelihood of survival is predicted to increase in size and age, while the rate of growth 
is predicted to decline in both size and age.
The sharp predictions of the evolutionary learning models were shown to depend 
principally on the positive efficiency-size relationship derived in the comparative statics 
analysis of the model. Since increases in efficiency are modelled analogously to output 
price increases in the learning models, it was of interest to explore the predictions of the 
learning models for a class of firms known to have a "perverse supply response", as in 
the case of the labour managed firm. In Chapter II, the evolutionary learning models 
were solved using the objective function of the Wardian Illyrian firm in place of profit 
maximisation, and it was shown that the efficiency-size relationship that results from this 
exercise is either indeterminate, or under certain plausible assumptions, negative, leading 
to the breakdown of many of the growth and survival predictions of the learning models.
The literature on labour managed firms has devoted much time and research to models 
which overcome the perverse short run supply response by adding various degrees of 
complication to the Wardian Illyrian firm model. This model has indeed been criticised 
extensively for being overly simplistic relative to the actual nature of cooperatives in 
western economies and too naive to enable proper empirical testing. Before testing our 
results on a dataset of French producer cooperatives, we felt it necessary to address the 
issue of the over-simplicity of the Illyrian firm model by extending the model to 
incorporate a number of key institutional rules which govern the behaviour of 
cooperatives in France. In particular, the new model in Chapter III allows for 
nonmember labour, internal and external financing, free access to membership by 
nonmember workers, and shutdown rules similar to those that actually prevail in France. 
The net result was a much more complicated model that effectively behaved startlingly 
similarly to the simpler general case Illyrian firm model. The efficiency-size relationship 
crucial to the discussion here remained indeterminate. This led to the conclusion that the 
failure of the evolutionary models to produce sharp and clear predictions as in the case 
of profit maximisation could not be attributed to the simplicity of the basic Illyrian firm 
model.
With the breakdown of the clear positive relationship between efficiency and size, the 
models were unable to yield as many testable predictions as they had for the profit 
maximising firm. The only testable predictions that were robust to the change in 
ownership form were the few that were independent of the efficiency-size relationship. 
These results are derived from the nature of the learning process, and are unaffected by 
the ownership structure. The key difference between the behaviour of the two types of
firm came from the comparative statics results: a labour managed firm would revise its 
output in response to an increase in efficiency by less than an identically efficient 
capitalist firm facing the same shocks. However, without any good proxy for efficiency 
and a matched sample of capitalist and labour managed firms, it was virtually impossible 
to test this finding.
The main result we were able to test was whether indeed the efficiency-size result was 
negative, as indicated in the special case of the Illyrian firm model. Chapter IV did 
exactly this, using a dataset of French producer cooperatives from 1979-1989. While 
efficiency could not be observed directly from the data, the underlying efficiency-size 
relationship could be inferred from the estimated growth-size, growth-age and survival- 
size relationships. The empirical results led to the rejection of the negative efficiency- 
size hypothesis and the conclusion that empirically these firms do not to behave 
substantially differently from conventional profit maximising firms.
2. The Anomaly
At the end of the analysis we discovered that the theoretical models are sensitive to 
changes in the internal organisation of the firm, yet the empirical relationships discussed 
hold generically across a broad range of different types of firm. The explanation that 
arises from this anomaly is that the theoretical models must be restricting the problem 
excessively by imposing too much structure on the determinants of fluctuations in firm 
size. Thus it appears that some extremely specific and detailed models are being used 
to explain what are in fact rather broad and generic empirical regularities.
In particular, the over-restrictiveness of the learning models can be traced directly to the 
modelling of the efficiency gains from learning as cost-reducing (or productivity 
enhancing). This narrow view of efficiency gains leads to the modelling strategy of 
having an efficiency-related multiple to the cost (or production) function, which as has 
been shown, leads to the breakdown of the results under alternative organisational forms 
such as labour management.
3. The Way Forward
The age element introduced by the evolutionary learning models appears not only 
empirically legitimate, but it is also the only prediction of the theoretical models that is 
robust to changes in the firm’s internal organisational structure. When the objective 
function of the Illyrian labour managed firm is used in the theoretical modelling, the 
positive survival-age relationship and the negative relation of the variance of growth to 
age result of the previous research is unaffected. The aging process appears to be 
stabilising in the sense that over time firms are increasingly unlikely to fail and 
increasingly unlikely to change their size of operations substantially. This suggests that 
the learning and adjustment going on within the firm over time leads ultimately to a 
convergence to some steady state equilibrium beyond a particular age.
Thus in order to create a broader and more generic model of firm growth and survival, 
it appears that some form of history-dependency in the probability transition matrix must 
be maintained while broadening the nature of the firm’s learning process. Such a general 
formulation does not necessarily yield a specific model, but rather is satisfied by a broad 
class of models.
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The first key ingredient of this broader class of models is some form of age-dependent 
learning which results in periodic revisions in the firm’s "state" which is characterised 
by its size. Such revisions may lead to exit by the firm if its state falls below some exit 
threshold. However, the actual nature of the learning process does not need to be as 
sharply defined as in Jovanovic (1982) or Ericson and Pakes (1989). In fact, any of a 
class of learning processes in which the learning curve is initially steep and eventually 
asymptotically concave will yield an increasing concave (beyond an initial period) 
survival-age relationship and a decreasing convex relationship between the variance of 
the growth rate and age.
The second key ingredient required for the remainder of the results to hold is that 
efficiency and firm size must be positively related independently of the objective function 
of the firm. To this end, it is useful to broaden the nature of learning and extend the role 
of efficiency from the cost-reducing multiple of Jovanovic and the process innovation of 
Ericson and Pakes to encompass a more general class of possible improvements to the 
firm’s "state" relative to its competitors. Malerba (1992) lists six classes of learning 
processes (See Table I), all of which need to be considered in determining the type of 
model we seek to construct. The Ericson and Pakes learning clearly falls in category 6, 
learning by searching, since their active exploration firm engages in costly learning 
through R&D to attempt to improve its market position relative to its rivals. To this list 
we add a seventh category, learning by observing, to incorporate Jovanovic’s type of 
passive Bayesian learning in which the firm does not act to improve its production or 
technological knowledge but rather learns about its static and existing comparative 
advantage relative to its rivals.
Table I
TYPES OF LEARNING PROCESSES
1) Learning by doing (cumulative production, investment)
2) Learning by using (products and processes)
3) Learning from advances in science and technology (external to the firm)
4) Learning from inter-industry spillovers (also external)
5) Learning by interacting (with suppliers, users, and competitors)
6) Learning by searching (R&D, etc.)
7) Learning by observing (passive)
Consider first efficiency gains which are cost-reducing (or equivalently productivity 
enhancing). The learning process is of critical importance because its nature establishes 
the direction and sign of causality between efficiency and size, as can be seen from Table 
II. The different learning processes vary greatly in their implicit efficiency-size causality. 
In those cases where the causality runs from size to efficiency, then in the absence of 
large information and transaction costs within the firm the sign of the efficiency-size 
relationship will generally be positive irrespective of the internal structure and ownership 
of the firm. That is, by definition larger firms are always more efficient. Where the 
causality runs from efficiency to size or in both directions1, further assumptions are
lrThe causality runs in both directions if on the one hand, efficiency gains lower costs 
and impact the firm’s optimal scale, but on the other hand the firm’s scale makes it more 
or less likely to learn (from technology changes, spillovers, interactions, etc.)
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Table n
Implications of Learning Models for Direction and Sign of Efficiency-Size
Relationship
Type of Learning Efficiency-Size
Causality
Efficiency- 
Size Sign**
Probability 
Transition Matrix
1. By Doing S* E Positive Observations up to 
learning threshold 
weighted equally.
2. By Using S* E Positive Same as 1.
3. From 
technological 
change
S ~ E Ownership-
Dependent
(OD)
Most recent observations 
carry greatest weight.
4. From spillovers S «*E OD Same as 3.
5. By interacting S «*E OD Same as 3.
6. By searching S <- E OD Same as 3.
7. By observing S - E OD All observations carry 
equal weights.
* In these cases, size should be interpreted as cumulative size.
** Assuming no transaction or information costs exist within the firm which would make 
small firms more efficient.
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needed to determine the sign of the relationship, but in general the sign will be affected 
by the ownership structure of the firm.
Observation: I f  efficiency is cost-reducing or productivity-enhancing, then as long as 
the causality runs from  efficiency to size the sign o f  the efficiency-size relationship will 
depend on the ownership structure o f the firm. Where size determines efficiency, the 
sign o f  the efficiency-size relationship will be independent o f  ownership structure.
Of course, the nature of the efficiency gain from learning may go well beyond the simple 
cost-reduction notion used by both Jovanovic and Ericson and Pakes, as well as by the 
learning by doing literature (Arrow, 1962, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988). It may for 
instance lead to yield improvements, changes in production technology, horizontal and 
vertical product improvements, and the introduction of altogether new products, processes 
and marketing methods (Malerba, 1992). The above observation no longer holds if 
efficiency is characterised in this broader way since efficiency may affect size through, 
for example, the addition of new products.
This provides a picture of a broad class of learning activity which leads to differing 
improvements in the firm’s state. Although we can group the outcomes of all these 
learning processes as improvements in efficiency, in this context it clearly is no longer 
relevant to formulate efficiency as a cost (or production) function multiple. This is 
exactly what we would like to avoid doing, since the cost (production) function multiple 
is what is causing the models to be excessively sensitive to organisational form. But 
there is in fact no obvious mathematical characterisation of the broader efficiency
improvements discussed here which can be used to replace the cost (production) function 
multiple. It is clear we will need to use a much more general framework.
Consider a model of firm size where in each period size can take any of a finite range 
of possible values {0,1,...,M}. The firm’s succession of sizes over time constitutes a 
sequence of random variables, where at any time t, {St}={S0, Su ... St}. The state of 
the firm is given by its size, which we assume is correlated with its efficiency in the 
broad sense described above, although we leave the direction of causality open. Size 
zero is an absorbing state - that is if a firm’s size falls to zero it exits and does not 
reappear. At any time t, if the firm’s current size is given by state i, then the likelihood 
that the firm’s size in the next period (t+1) will equal some other value j, (Py), is 
governed by a state dependent transition probability matrix:
oo * 01
10 *  11
.. P,0M
.. P1M
P  PM0 M l .. PMM
o, E V 1
j - 0
P 00= 1 >
poj=0 f ° r j*0
If the probability transition matrix were given by a simple Markov process, then each 
time the firm found itself in state i there will be the same fixed probability Py that it 
would next be in state j - that is the process would be memoryless. However, we know 
this not to be empirically correct if the state is given by firm size: Old firms are much 
less likely to experience a sudden spurt in growth or a reversion to state zero than young 
firms are (See Figure 1). Thus we would prefer that the probability transition should
Figure 1: Old Surviving Firms Are Less Likely than Young Firms to 
Experience a Sudden Spurt in Growth
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have memory, or equivalently that a learning process is In action, so that the history of 
the random variable is in some way relevant to the likelihood of its future value.
There are a number of ways to incorporate memory of the firm’s history into the 
probability transition matrix (See Table II), and this will depend on the exact nature of 
the learning process being considered. The historic dependency of the probability 
transition matrix may be such that each past observation carries the same weight, as in 
Jovanovic’s (1982) Bayesian learning model. In this model the firm is continuously 
accumulating information on a stationary efficiency parameter, so all past observations 
are equally important in determining the firm’s current expectation of its efficiency. 
Conversely, in the active exploration model of Ericson and Pakes (1989) as well as the 
models in which learning is from sources external to the firm, the most recent 
observations carry correspondingly higher weights, since the firm’s efficiency is evolving 
over time and very old information no longer bears much relevance to the current state.2 
The same applies to models 3 to 5 in Table II, all of which have external sources of 
learning and involve changing firm efficiencies over time so that the recent observations 
are most indicative of the current state of the firm.
The nature of the probability transition matrix is more complex in the first two models 
of Table II, where the firm’s size determines its efficiency and firms prefer to be larger 
in order to be more efficient. In these models it is the firm’s cumulative size which
2Pakes and Ericson (1990) find evidence in support of the notion that the Jovanovic 
model may be more relevant for retail firms whose efficiency is more likely to depend 
on stationary factors such as the location of an outlet, while their own (1989) model is 
more suited to manufacturing firms, where R&D plays a greater role.
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determines its efficiency, at least up to some threshold beyond which it has little left to 
learn. If we assume there exists some maximum learning threshold above which the firm 
ceases to learn and efficiency reaches its maximum, then the probability transition matrix 
will have two distinct parts. Below the maximum learning threshold, the firm’s size will 
depend on its cumulative size to date, so all past observations on size will be equally 
weighted in determining the probability of moving to other states. Above this threshold, 
the firm’s size will follow a Markov process whereby the probability density function is 
centred around current size with a smaller variance than before.
In all these models the firm’s learning increases over time at an eventually diminishing 
rate. Thus, we can imagine any of these learning models acting in the same way: In each 
period the firm adds to its stock of knowledge, and the new information it acquires 
constitutes the "news" for that period. This "news" generates shocks to its system which 
impact its size in the sense that if it receives bad news this generates new costs to the 
firm while if the news is good it leads to expansion (such as the addition of new 
products). Large firms at any age are better able to sustain shocks because their larger 
size and cash flow provide them with a cushioning from unexpected costs. But the nature 
of the shocks are age-dependent: As long as the learning curve is increasing, initially 
steep and eventually flat, it will be the case that the variability and magnitude of the 
"news" declines with age, causing older firms to be less likely to fail or to experience 
large deviations in size.
If we add to this structure heterogeneous initial firm efficiencies (due to differing 
managerial skills, location choice, initial technology, etc.) the learning process will yield
a size distribution of firms with larger and older firms benefitting from a more advanced 
state of knowledge. These larger and older firms will be less vulnerable to failure, and 
as they reach the limits of their learning possibilities, they will settle into steady state 
growth rates which will no longer depend on their size or age.
The exact formulation of such a model is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is clear 
that there is a good deal of work remaining to be done on modelling the growth and 
survival process of firms, and this topic will remain on the research agenda of industrial 
economists for some time yet.
APPENDIX: An Overview of Labour Management Theory and Practice
I would like to thank Saul Estrin and Lina Takla for helpful comments and 
suggestions on this section. Any remaining errors are my own.
1. Introduction
This appendix is directed at readers unfamiliar with the nature of the cooperative sector 
in western economies, and with the theoretical literature on labour management. It is 
arranged as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview of the institutional structure of 
the cooperative sector in the western world, highlighting some of the differences and 
similarities across countries. Section 3 provides an overview of the economic theory of 
the labour managed firm relative to the profit maximising firm, stressing some of the 
concepts key to the research in this thesis.
2. An Overview of the Cooperative Sector Worldwide
Producer cooperatives have existed in the western world economies for over a century. 
Although they still remain fairly rare relative to the overall population of firms, a number 
of nations have developed quite large and well established cooperative sectors, including 
France, Italy, Spain, Israel, and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, the United
Distribution of Cooperatives in 1981
I ta ly France U.K. Msndragon
Nuntjor o f  F Ir r s  ^ 1 1 ,0 0 0 1 ,0 1 8 168 80
Biploym ent 10, 000 9 1 ,3 9 2 7 ,0 0 0 1 6 ,0 0 0
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States, Germany, Sweden and Denmark and even developing countries such as Tanzania, 
Sri Lanka and Fiji. In addition the state cooperative sector in the former Yugoslavia has 
also been studied extensively (Estrin, 1983, Stephen, 1984).
Typically producer cooperatives have tended to locate in construction-related industries, 
light manufacturing, and more recently in services where production is fairly labour 
intensive and start-up costs tend to be low. While the institutional features of these firms 
vary greatly across these nations, for the most part a number of general features are held 
in common by cooperatives worldwide.
2.1 Membership Rights 
Profitsharing
Membership in a cooperative is characterised by equity ownership which entitles workers 
to profitsharing as well as participatory rights. Members must typically own at least one 
share in the firm, and in most cases there exist restrictions on the maximum portion of 
shares any individual may own. All profitable cooperatives pay some share of their 
residual to workers; in France for example, this share must at least equal 25 percent. 
The mechanism for distributing profits varies; in some cases it is on an egalitarian per 
head basis (U.S., Israel), in others the maximum gap in earnings across the firm’s labour 
force is restricted (Spain, Italy), and in others profit shares are weighted according to 
each member’s contribution in hours, skill, seniority, etc. (France, U.K.) Similarly, if 
the firm incurs losses these must also be financed by members, and this typically occurs 
through a lowering of the share price and/or the issuing of new shares which must be 
purchased by new or existing members. If such measures are insufficient or impossible,
typically the firm will shut down.
Most cooperatives may employ nonmember or "hired" labour. The principal exception 
to this rule is the sector of Mondragon cooperatives in the Spanish Basque provinces, 
where only temporary nonmember labour may be hired. In some countries, there is a 
cap on the maximum ratio of nonmember workers (50 percent in Italy) and/or a minimum 
required number of members (France, Italy, UK, US). The treatment of nonmember 
labour varies; these may be paid a fixed wage (U.S., U.K.) or they may receive 
profitsharing similar to members (France, Italy).
In countries such as France and Italy there exist rules of Free Access; that is, nonmember 
workers or even new workers wishing to become members are allowed entry by means 
of the purchase of membership shares. Similarly, members wishing to relinquish this 
status may give it up by selling back their membership shares to the firm. However, in 
practice it is unclear to what extent access to and exit from membership is freely 
available, and there is evidence of discriminatory and strategic behaviour by members to 
prevent admission to entrants they perceive as undesirable. In Spain and Israel, for 
example, potential members must apply and be accepted by the existing membership body 
before they can purchase membership shares.
Return on Equity
In addition to profitsharing, members are also in some cases entitled to receive some 
form of return on membership shares. For ideological reasons, this return has generally 
be small and has been capped (France, Italy, U.K.); in some cases it is set to zero.
Participation
Participatory rights vary greatly across countries, but in all cases members get one vote 
each regardless of the proportion of shares they own. In most cases cooperatives above 
a certain size of employment elect either a manager or a committee to run the day to day 
operations of the firm. Major decisions will normally be made by general assembly 
voting by all the members, although this varies and in the case of Yugoslavia it appears 
that most decisions were in fact made at the state level even though the workers 
nominally had decision-making powers.1
2.2 Financial Structure
Typically the cooperative’s members own the firm’s capital, either collectively (France, 
Italy, Spain, U.S.) or by a combination of collective and individual ownership (some UK 
firms). More unusual is the Yugoslav case where capital was socially owned by the 
nation at large.2 Where capital is collectively owned, workers-members must hold an 
equity stake in the firm. Equity shares are typically valued at par (France, Italy), so 
appreciation in the value of the firm’s capital is not directly realisable through share 
redemption. Membership is normally not tradable either, and new members must buy 
their equity from the firm while departing members must sell their equity to the firm, 
with all transactions at par value.
Financing is most often through internal equity financing or retained earnings. In fact 
in some countries, some portion of profits must be set aside by law for reinvestment.
^ ee  Estrin (1983), Stephen (1984).
2Estrin (1983).
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Where this is inadequate, the firm may resort to external borrowing from the banking 
sector. In some countries there exist preferential borrowing arrangements or tax 
advantages for cooperatives (France, Italy, U.K., Spain.) More rarely, external 
purchases of equity in the firm can be permitted at times, although this tends to be 
discouraged since it violates the cooperative spirit of these organisations. In the Yugoslav 
system, debt financing was centrally allocated by banks to the firms and this formed the 
principal source of the firm’s capital. Nevertheless, there was some self-financing by 
enterprises although the share of self financing was only 10 percent in 1953, rising to 38 
percent by 1964. From 1964-1974 the state withdrew its direct control and enterprises 
became more active in their own financing.
2.3 Exit
Shutdown conditions vary as well across nations. In most cases, in order to preserve the 
cooperative sector from disappearance, laws have been enacted preventing the residual 
value of the firm over and above the face value of outstanding shares to be paid back to 
members. Typically, this value may be donated to other cooperatives, or revert back to 
the overseeing organisation (France), but may never revert back to owners. This is 
designed to prevent the liquidation of successful firms for the realisation of capital gains. 
In some countries where such rules do not exist, such as for certain classes of 
cooperatives in the U.K., there has been a tendency for profitable cooperatives to be 
liquidated.3 Israel’s producer, transportation and service cooperatives differ from the 
above framework in that the share price is continuously adjusted to reflect the value of 
the firm’s assets. As a consequence, successful firms have accumulated considerable
3Estrin and Pdrotin (1987).
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amounts of capital raising the share price of the firm, and making it very difficult for 
prospective members to raise the cash necessary to purchase an equity stake in the firm. 
As a result the share of workers who are members has declined steadily over time.4 In 
the Yugoslav system, shutdown was virtually unheard of and was rendered unlikely by 
the very high interlinkages created among firms by inter-enterprise credit.
2.4 Cooperatives in France
Much of the theoretical analysis and all of the empirical analysis in this thesis deals with 
the French producer cooperative sector, which is briefly surveyed in this section. The 
institutional rules governing French cooperatives have been particularly well designed to 
combat the pitfalls that typically have led to the demise of such firms elsewhere. To 
begin with, France has entirely avoided the issue known in the economics literature as 
"degeneration", that is that successful cooperatives will replace departing members with 
cheaper hired workers until there is only one member left and the firm is essentially a 
capitalist firm. The French have achieved this by a number of means: first, nonmembers 
are paid equal profitsharing to members in the firm, and since the return on shares is 
capped at low or even negative effective rates of return, there is little if any difference 
in incomes between the two classes of workers; second, free access to membership 
ensures that even if the ceiling on the return on membership shares is set high enough so 
that it becomes a nonbinding constraint, the conversion of nonmember to member labour 
will drive the real return on membership shares down to near zero. Additionally, the 
French system ties the maximum return on the firm’s equity to the average yield on 
corporate bonds over the past six months, thereby preventing the return on membership
4Russell (1991).
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shares in profitable firms from falling too far out of line with the market outside the firm. 
And finally, the French system precludes the reversion of the firm’s accumulated surplus 
to members in the event of shutdown, eliminating the members’ incentive to shut down 
a profitable firm in order to realize capital gains.
A major portion of the liberalising legislation was passed in 1978, prompting a boost in 
the rate of cooperative formation.
Number of Producer Cooperatives in France 
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Y ear
Figure 2
The I980’s saw a remarkable growth in the number of firms operating in the French 
cooperative sector, as can be seen from Figure 2 above.
3. Comparative Economics Literature
3.1 The Perverse Short Run Supply Response
From the start economists studying labour management discovered novel and unusual 
implications of cooperative behaviour relative to conventional profit maximising firms. 
This led to a burgeoning of the literature on the comparative behaviour of such firms.
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Benjamin Ward’s seminal paper (1958) laid the groundwork for much of the work that 
was to follow, and coined the phrase the "Illyrian firm" to denote the utopian cooperative 
he based his discussion on. Ward’s firm was an all member cooperative in which 
workers received a fixed wage, capital was rented at a fixed rate, and all remaining 
profits were shared out on a per head basis to member-shareholders as dividends. He 
showed formally that with capital fixed in the short run, such a firm would respond to 
an increase in prices by contracting employment and output, leading to the famous 
"negatively sloped short run supply curve" result.
Effect of Increase In Price on Labour Input 
Short Run CK ftxecQ
L
L L 
2 1
Figure 3
The intuition of the result is clear from Figure 3 above: The Illyrian firm sets the 
marginal revenue product from the last worker employed to equal the dividend that must 
be paid to him. An increase in price raises both the marginal revenue product of labour, 
and the dividend, but it raises the latter by more. This means that with the existing 
labour force the contribution of the marginal worker falls below what the firm must pay 
him. Thus the optimal course of action is for the firm to contract employment thereby
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increasing the dividend to its maximum possible level.
Over subsequent years the analysis of the Illyrian firm was extended further, most notably 
with the work of Domar (1966) extending the model to the multi-input and output case, 
and Vanek with the general equilibrium extension (1970), and as well as countless others. 
Later work extended the analysis to the long run behaviour of the Illyrian firm model, 
where the price response of the firm was shown to be indeterminate (Ireland and Law, 
1982, Estrin, 1982.)
Most of the work dealt with the static analysis of such firms until Atkinson (1973) 
developed a steady state model of cooperative growth. In his model, which is a fixed 
input proportions model, he incorporates technological progress and scale economies. 
While aggregate demand is shifting out over time, Atkinson’s firm can enhance its 
demand further by means of promotional spending. The firm’s only incentive to grow 
is to achieve scale economies, so the rate of growth selected depends on the extent of 
scale economies and the effective discount rate of the workers. The latter, of course, 
determines how valuable scale economies achieved in the future will be to the firm. 
Atkinson shows that the steady state growth rate selected by the labour managed firm will 
always be less than that of the profit maximising firm over the regions that both firms 
will remain in business.
3.2 Life Cycle and Degeneration
It was somewhat later that papers addressing the life cycle of cooperative forms of 
organisation appeared, in particular Ben Ner (1988) who suggested a countercyclical
pattern existed in cooperative formation. He posited that in recessionary periods we 
would witness large scale conversion of failing capitalist firms into cooperatives as 
workers would seek to retain their jobs and gain from the internalisation of the owner- 
worker conflicts.
A separate strand of literature, the degeneration literature, raised doubts about the long 
term viability of the cooperative form of organization. These ideas are attributed to Ben 
Ner (1984) and Miyazaki (1984). The idea here was that since it is common practice for 
these firms to employ hired workers, if such workers were paid a fixed wage they would 
cost a profitable firm less than the profitsharing paid to members. Thus the firm would 
always be made better off if departing members were replaced with cheaper hired 
workers. Of course in the limit, a sole member would remain and the firm would 
effectively have been transformed into a capitalist firm.
3.3 Underinvestment
Yet another strand of literature, associated principally with Furubotn and Pejovich (1974), 
emphasised the loss of property rights in the labour managed firm, and the impact this 
would have on investment policy. Where workers are unable to claim the residual 
surplus of the firm in the event of shutdown, the incentive is to distribute all surplus as 
dividends and to borrow externally to finance investment. If capital markets are in any 
way biased against these firms, this will result in capital shortage. Even if not, 100 
percent debt financing is seldom possible or advisable in practice (Ellerman, 1986). And 
workers with the shortest time horizons will be disagreeable to even borrowing for 
investment, since they would rather receive the rental cost as income.
4. Summary
It is clear that the cooperative sector in the Western world is of substantial importance 
in absolute terms, even if it is small in relative terms. Furthermore the issues raised by 
the theoretical literature have underscored the contrast in the predicted behaviour of these 
firms vis-k-vis conventional capitalist firms. While this appendix does not (and is not 
meant to) represent a comprehensive survey of the labour managed firm literature, it 
should provide the reader who is unfamiliar with the area with adequate background to 
follow the rest of the thesis.
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